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Abstract
Part I of this Article scrutinizes the current definition of genocide in view of its theoretical
circumscription in the Genocide Convention and with special reference to the judgment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Part II considers the validity
and the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction to the crime of genocide, and the
consequent duty of states to bring perpetrators of genocide to justice. Part III focuses on the
jurisdiction ratione materia of the ICC regarding the crime of genocide. Part IV will pay special
attention to the prosecution of genocide in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
When indictments were drafted for purposes of the Nurem-
berg Trials, genocide was not yet perceived as an international
crime in its own right, and for that reason the German war
criminals, including those directly responsible for and engaged
in the execution of the Holocaust, were indicted to stand trial on
charges of crimes against the peace, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and a common plan or conspiracy to commit these
former crimes.I Genocide was indeed mentioned in the Nurem-
berg indictment, but only as a distinct manifestation of war
crimes' and crimes against humanity.'
In 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations pro-
claimed that the crime of genocide is "a denial of the right to
existence of entire human groups" and noted that such denial
"shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to hu-
manity in the form of cultural and other contributions repre-
* I.T. Cohen Professor of International Law and Human Rights, Emory University.
1. See 1 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946 27-92 (listing charges in
indictment) (Nuremberg: Int'l Mil. Tribunal, 1946-49).
2. Id. at 43-44. Under the rubric of war crimes, the indictment accused the de-
fendants of committing "deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of
racial and national groups, against the civilian population of certain occupied territo-
ries in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or
religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others." Id. at 43-44; see also 2
id., at 45-46.
3. 1 Id. at 65. Although genocide is not mentioned by name in Count IV (crimes
against humanity), prosecution in this part of the indictment also relied upon instances
of genocide mentioned in Count III (war crimes). Further specifics of what amounted
to acts of genocide in charges based on crimes against humanity included the system-
atic persecution of Jews, which involved their being "deprived of liberty, thrown into
concentration camps where they were murdered and ill-treated" and confiscation of
their properties. Id. at 66; 2 id. at 70; see also Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. IN'L &
COMP. L. 415, 426 (1998).
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
sented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral law and
the spirit and aims of the United Nations."4 The International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1948' (or "Genocide Convention") finally provided
the basis for the emergence of a norm of customary interna-
tional law, with the force of jus cogens, which renders genocide
punishable. As such, the crime of genocide is subject to univer-
sal jurisdiction.
In 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in
the case of Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,6 rendered the first con-
viction ever for acts of genocide. Earlier, in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina v. Yugoslavia,' the International Court of Justice rejected a
submission of the Respondent to the effect that the responsibil-
ity of states under the Genocide Convention entails no more
than a duty to prevent and punish acts of genocide. Instead, the
International Court of Justice held that the Genocide Conven-
tion does not preclude state responsibility for acts of genocide.
These cases are authority for the proposition that the definition
and scope of the crime of genocide as a proscription of custom-
ary international law have developed well beyond the confines
dictated by the wording of the Genocide Convention itself.
On June 15 through July 17, 1998, the United Nations Dip-
lomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries was held in Rome, Italy,
with a view to "finalizing and adopting a convention on the es-
4. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Part II (Resolutions), U.N. Doc. A/64/
Add.1 (1947); see also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 14, 23 (May 28); Case Concerning Applica-
tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 1 (April
8); Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 348 (Sept. 13).
5. G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Part 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
[hereafter "Genocide Convention"].
6. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998). Sum-
mary of judgment is published in 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998). However, citations in the
following paragraphs are from the original judgment in the case. See also Paul J.
Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: The 1998 Kambanda and Akayesu Cases, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 517, 522-27 (noting
that, before Akayesu, Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to acts of genocide committed in
Rwanda, and was sentenced to life in prison).
7. Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July
11).
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tablishment of an international criminal court."8 The Rome
Conference was preceded by deliberations in New York of an Ad
Hoc Committee (1995) and a Preparatory Committee (1996-
1998), operating under a mandate of the General Assembly of
the United Nations to refine a Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court that had been prepared by the International Law
Commission ("ILC").' The Rome Conference culminated in the
approval, by majority vote,10 of the text of the Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court11 ("ICC Statute"). The International
Criminal Court ("ICC") was given jurisdiction to punish perpe-
trators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 12 in
cases where the national courts of a country with custody of the
suspect are "unwilling" or "unable" to do so.13
Part I of this Article scrutinizes the current definition of ge-
nocide in view of its theoretical circumscription in the Genocide
Convention and with special reference to the judgment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v.
Akayesu. Part II considers the validity and the application of the
principle of universal jurisdiction to the crime of genocide, and
the consequent duty of states to bring perpetrators of genocide
to justice. Part III focuses on the jurisdiction ratione materia of
the ICC regarding the crime of genocide. Part IV will pay special
attention to the prosecution of genocide in the United States.
I. THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE
Genocide has been defined as follows in the Genocide Con-
vention:
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
8. G.A. Res. 52/160, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 384, 3, U.N. Doc.
A/52/49 (1997).
9. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 46' Session,
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 29, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994).
10. Id. The ICC Statute was adopted by 120 votes in favor, 7 against, and 21 ab-
stentions. Id.
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998) [hereafter "ICC Statute"].
12. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(c).
13. Id. art. 17.
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(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to an-
other group. 4
This definition has been retained without change in subse-
quent instruments, including the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,15 the Statute of the
International Criminal Court for Rwanda,16 and the ICC Stat-
ute." The Genocide Convention not only renders acts of geno-
cide punishable, but also makes conspiracy to commit genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to
commit genocide, and complicity in genocide punishable as
well.18 This rule is similarly framed in the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia19 and in the
one for Rwanda.20 The ICC Statute does not refer to any of
these forms of participation in the crime of genocide. The Stat-
utes of the two ad hoc criminal tribunals confer criminal respon-
sibility upon any person who "planned, instigated, ordered, com-
mitted or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, prepara-
tion or execution" of genocide or any of the other accessorial
acts mentioned above. 21
Five particular elements of the definition of genocide re-
quire closer scrutiny: the perpetrator of genocide, the actus reus,
the target group, the objectives constituting a component of
14. Genocide Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
15. Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 4(1), contained in annex of Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), reprinted
in 32 I.L.M. 1193 (1993).
16. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., art. 2(2), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
17. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 6.
18. Genocide Convention, supra note 5, at 174-75, art. 3.
19. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 15, art. 4(3).
20. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 16, art. 2(3).
21. Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 15, at 1194, art. 7(1); Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 16, art. 6(1).
1999]
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mens rea, and compliance of the definition with the demands of
nullum crimen sine lege.
A. The Perpetrator of Genocide
The perpetrators of genocide are not confined to states or
agencies of government, but can also be non-state actors.22 The
language of the Genocide Convention is indicative of an inten-
tion to confine liability under international law for acts of geno-
cide to natural persons only. It provides that "[p] ersons" com-
mitting genocide, or any of the other acts included in the Geno-
cide Convention's proscriptions, shall be punished. 2 Although
"persons" as ajuridical concept includes natural as well asjuristic
persons, the Article expressly refers to "responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals" as examples of persons who
might be punishable. 24 Restrictive interpretation of this provi-
sion-the general norm of construction that applies to punitive
provisions-and in particular application of the eiusdem generis-
rule, would suggest that an accused under the Genocide Con-
vention, ought to be confined to those who have something in
common with "responsible rulers, public officials or private indi-
viduals:" that is, natural persons to the exclusion of juristic per-
sons, including the state as a corporate body with legal subjectiv-
ity. The duty of State Parties to the Genocide Convention is
seemingly confined to undertaking "to prevent and to punish"
genocide as a crime under international law.2 5
These provisions raise several intriguing questions pertain-
ing to the criminal liability of natural persons (individuals) for
international crimes, the corporate liability of states for criminal
wrongdoing, and the corporate liability in international law of
juristic persons other than organs of state.
1. Criminal Liability of Natural Persons
In his opening statement in the Trial against Hermann Wil-
helm G6,ing and Others at Nuremberg, Chief Prosecuting Counsel
for the United States, Justice Robert H. Jackson, observed:
22. BeAnal v. Freeport-McMahon, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 361, 371 (E.D. La. 1997); but
see Lee A. Steven, Genocide and the Duty To Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States is in
Breach of Its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425, 438-39 (1999).
23. Genocide Convention, supra note 5, at 175, art. 4.
24. Id.
25. Id. art. 1.
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The principle of individual responsibility for piracy and brig-
andage, which have long been recognized as crimes punish-
able under international law, is old and well-established.
That is what illegal warfare is.
This principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as log-
ical one if international law is to render real help to the main-
tenance of peace. An international law which operates only
for states can be enforced only by war because the most prac-
ticable method of coercing a state is warfare.
Of course, the idea that a state, any more than a corporation,
commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are committed
only by persons. While it is quite proper to employ the fiction
of responsibility for a state or corporation for the purpose of
imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable to let such
a legalism become the basis of personal immunity.
26
The International Military Tribunal, in its judgment, echoed
these sentiments by holding that "international law imposes du-
ties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States," and
that "individuals can be punished for violations of international
law."'2 7 The Tribunal went on to proclaim:
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced.28
It is important to note that the reference to the criminal
conduct of individuals was not intended to exclude the criminal
liability of corporate institutions (juristic persons), but addressed
the traditional perception of the time that only states could be
subjects of international law. Regarding criminal liability under
international law, Nuremberg held that not to be the case. Nu-
remberg emphatically rejected the proposition that interna-
tional law is only concerned with the actions of sovereign states
and, therefore, provides no punishment for individuals, as well
as the assumption that when an act of state is in issue, those car-
rying it out cannot be held personally responsible.2 9
26. 2 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 1, at 149-50.
27. 1 Id. at 223. Judgment has been reprinted in International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, October 1, 1946, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 220, 220-21
(1947).
28. 1 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 1, at 223.
29. Id. at 222-23; International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), supra note 27, at 220.
19991
292 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:286
Nuremberg provided no answer, however, to the further
question of whether the individual subject of international crimi-
nal law should be confined to persons executing acts of state, to
the exclusion of individuals acting in their private capacity.
Some believe that only individuals executing acts of the state
should be held liable for international crimes. Louis Sohn 30 pro-
claimed:
It is difficult to proceed against great sovereign states, and
even more difficult to punish them in any meaningful fash-
ion. States function through individuals, however, and even-
tually means are likely to be found to punish those who are
truly responsible for a state's behavior."'
Rupa Bhattacharyya, however, begged to differ:
If compliance can be imposed under international law on in-
dividuals who are acting in an official capacity, then there is
no legitimate reason why individuals acting in private capaci-
ties are also not subject to international laws. If, after all, the
international legal order is to be constituted as a rule-of-law
system, it is necessary that respect for that law be fostered
through its equal application to all members of international
society.3 2
The generality of this exposition of individual criminal lia-
bility under international criminal law does not address the
question of whether a state, by means of treaty arrangements, is
capable of rendering its private citizens punishable under inter-
national law per se (in contradistinction to incorporating crimi-
nal proscriptions enunciated in a treaty into the municipal law of
30. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
31. Id. at 12; see also Rupa Bhattacharyya, Establishing a Rule-of-Law International
Criminal Justice System, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 57, 93-94 (1996); Christopher L. Blakesley,
Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and Trigger Mechanisms, 25 DENv. J. INr'L L. & PoL'y 235,
239 (1997) (noting that "individual responsibility must be the cornerstone of any inter-
national court."); Judgment of International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia
in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. 317, 140 (1999) (holding that treaty-based
and customary rules of humanitarian law "first and foremost address themselves to the
acts of individuals, in particular to State officials or more generally, to officials of a party
to the conflict or else to individuals acting at the instigation or with the consent or
acquiescence of a party to the conflict.").
32. Bhattacharyya, supra note 31, at 74; see also ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibil-
ity, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) (stating that
"[a]n individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind is
responsible therefore and is liable to punishment").
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the contracting state). When Marek St. Korowics many years ago
asserted the subjectivity of individuals under international law
with reference, inter alia, to the criminal liability of individuals
for certain international crimes, he constructed that liability only
as a matter of "the state implementing international agreements
within its own municipal jurisdiction."33
The question as to the criminal liability under international
law of natural persons also raises the further question whether
"international criminal law" can lay claim to une raison d itre be-
yond or alongside the municipal criminal justice systems of na-
tion-states. In 1950, Georg Schwartzenberger was of the opinion
that a state could do no more than contract an international ob-
ligation to criminalize certain acts within its national legal system
and to punish individuals committing those crimes as a matter of
municipal law. 4 Schwartzenberger spoke of "offenses against
rules of internationally postulated municipal criminal law."35
It is now trite that individuals acting personally or as agents
of a government can be held accountable for international
crimes.36 The generality of this statement of the law, however,
requires qualification. The criminal responsibility of individuals
33. Marek St. Korowics, The Problem of International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM.
J. INT'L L. 533, 545 (1956).
34. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 263 (1950).
35. Id. at 268. Schwartzenberger distinguished between (a) extension of national
criminal jurisdiction to acts committed outside national borders; (b) incurring interna-
tional obligation to punish acts of individuals under a country's own municipal criminal
law; (c) the duty resting on all states under international law to punish within their own
territorial jurisdiction acts identified as criminal violations of ius gentium (piracy and
war crimes); (d) the punishment of acts in municipal courts which, if not prosecuted,
would render the country concerned liable under international law (forgery of foreign
coins and banknotes); (e) the responsibility of states to cooperate with one another in
administration of criminal justice (extradition of suspects); and (f) international delin-
quencies and crimes in the true sense, which does not subject a state to punishment but
may only compel it to make reparation for moral or material wrongdoing. All instances
mentioned in (a) to (e) are really matters of municipal criminal law, given the retribu-
tory constraints of (f). Schwartzenberger questioned whether one could at all speak of
international criminal law. Id. at 264-74.
36. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992) 505-08, 148; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 514 (1999); John W. Bridge, The Case for an International Court of
Criminal Justice, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 213, 223
(Mark W. Janis ed. 1992); Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Univer-
sal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAw. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
153, 161 (1996); David Stoelting, Status Report on the International Criminal Court, 3 HOF-
STRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 233, 252 (1999).
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acting in their private capacity-therefore not as organs of state
action-must be confined to transgressions of criminal proscrip-
tions under customary international law only. In Ex Parte Quirin,
Chief Justice Harlan Stone said:
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recog-
nized and applied the law of war as including that part of the
law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the
status, rights and duties of enemy nationals as well as enemy
individuals.3
7
In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Court similarly held that rape, tor-
ture, and summary executions committed by an individual as
part of genocide are actionable as "violations of the law of na-
tions" under the Alien Tort Claims Act (and therefore as a crime
under customary international law) "without regard to state ac-
tion."38 The Court also stated that the liability of private persons
for war crimes, having been recognized since World War I and
confirmed by the Nuremberg trials after World War II, has be-
come "an important aspect of international law."3"
The founding of criminal liability of (natural and juristic)
persons other than organs of government by means of treaty ar-
rangements is problematic. Many jurisdictions of the world recog-
nize the institution of pacta de contrahendo, whereby A and B can
enter into a binding agreement for the benefit of C. The creation
of binding obligations of a third person through the contractual
arrangements of A and B, however, is not commonly recog-
nized-if at all-since it would violate the foundation of the in-
stitution of consensual agreements. State A can therefore bind
itself and its officials/subordinate organs through the agency of
an international treaty, but cannot, in this writer's opinion, use
its treaty powers to criminalize under international law the con-
duct of its citizens acting in their private capacity. If a State Party
to a treaty undertakes to subject the conduct of its private citi-
37. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1943) (emphasis added). The rather ob-
scure distinction made between "enemy nationals" and "enemy individuals" at least in-
cludes persons acting as organs of state, and persons acting in their private capacity. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. III 1997); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 24344 (2d
Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 243; see also Jordan J. Paust, Suing Karadzic, 10 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 91, 97
(1997) (noting that private individuals are liable for violations of international law, "es-
pecially with respect to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity").
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zens to punishment, then it has to do so through its municipal
criminal justice system.
Current international law can be invoked to punish individ-
uals for crimes proclaimed as such by international law, subject
to the following norms:
" individuals can be held liable in the municipal courts of a
state for conduct identified as crimes under customary in-
ternational law, or proclaimed criminal in a particular
treaty and incorporated into the criminal justice system of
that state;
" an individual acting as an organ of state or privately can
be held criminally liable for conduct proclaimed to be a
crime under customary international law;
* a state can render individuals acting as agents of govern-
ment criminally liable under international law for con-
duct proclaimed to be criminal by treaty arrangements;
* a state cannot criminalize the conduct of private individu-
als by entering into a treaty that proclaims the conduct in
question punishable-here, the international obligation
of a State Party to the treaty can involve no more that a
commitment to criminalize and to punish the act within
the confines of the state's municipal criminal justice sys-
tem.
At the time of the entering into force of the Genocide Conven-
tion, the provision rendering private individuals liable for acts of
genocide and genocidal acts could therefore imply no more
than a duty of States Parties to criminalize and to punish the
crime of genocide and its accessories within their own municipal
criminal justice systems. But that has changed. Since genocide
has become a crime under customary international law,4" private
individuals can indeed be held liable under the rules of interna-
tional law for the crime of genocide.
2. Criminal Liability of States
Responsibility of states for wrongful conduct is indeed rec-
40. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, supra note 4, at 23 (stating that "the principles underlying the
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
States, even without conventional obligation. The Genocide Convention was therefore
intended by the General Assembly and by the contracting parties to be definitely uni-
versal in scope.").
1999]
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ognized in international law, and the remedies sanctioned by in-
ternational law for such wrongdoing entail both compensatory
and punitive elements. Corporate liability of states has thus
been recognized in regard to war crimes committed by Germany
during World Wars I and II, and leading experts in the field of
international criminal law have argued that the principle of col-
lective responsibility of states for criminal conduct can and
ought to be extended." According to M. Cherif Bassiouni, state
criminal responsibility would be no more than "a symbolic mani-
festation by the world community designed to stigmatize interna-
tionally violative behaviour, irrespective of the merits or effec-
tiveness of such stigmatization in preventing or controlling inter-
nationally violative behaviour."42 It is, however, submitted that
in the context of core crimes under customary international law,
corporate liability of states could mean more than just that.
The ILC's Draft Articles of State Responsibility43 include
proposals for state criminal liability, which-if acted upon-will
include retributory action for "a serious breach of an interna-
tional obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding
and preservation of the human environment, such as those
prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the
seas"44 --provided that the obligation is "so essential for the pro-
tection of fundamental interests of the international community
that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a
whole. '45 The ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind again underscores individual criminal liabil-
ity.
4 6
State responsibility for criminal conduct has been empha-
sized in several recent judgments of international tribunals. In
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, for example, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia proclaimed:
41. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT
STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 47-48 (1987).
42. Id. at 50.
43. ILCDraft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
125, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
44. Id. art. 19(3)(d).
45. Id. art. 19(2).
46. ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 14, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996). The Draft Code does,
as a general principle, recognize the responsibility of states under international law. Id.
art. 4.
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
Under current humanitarian law, in addition to individual
criminal liability, State responsibility may ensue as a result of
State officials engaging in torture or failing to prevent torture
or to punish torturers. If carried out as an extensive practice
of State officials, torture amounts to a serious breach on a
widespread scale of an international obligation of essential
importance for safeguarding the human being, thus constitut-
ing a particularly grave wrongful act generating State respon-
sibility.47
As far as genocide is concerned, the International Court of
Justice in Bosnia and Heregovina v. Yugoslavia, rejected a submis-
sion of the Respondent that the responsibility of states under the
Genocide Convention entails no more than a duty to prevent
and punish acts of genocide." The language of the Genocide
Convention, the court found, does not preclude any form of
state responsibility, and although the Genocide Convention con-
templated acts of genocide committed by "rulers" or "public offi-
cials, '49 it does not exclude "the responsibility of a State for acts
of its organs."50
As far as the ICC is concerned, it accepted from the outset
that states will not be subject to the court's jurisdiction. It was
also decided in Rome that the court will not exercise jurisdiction
over juristic persons. 1 The jurisdiction ratione personae of the
ICC was therefore confined to natural persons (over the age of
18 years). 52
3. Criminal Liability of Juristic Persons Other Than the State
The criminal justice system of most countries of the world
recognize that a juristic person can be held liable for criminal
conduct. Those indicted to stand trial in Nuremberg certainly
included several organizations, including the Reich Cabinet, the
leadership corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, the Gestapo, the SA,
and the General Staff of the High Command of the Armed
47. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. 317, 142 (1999).
48. See Genocide Convention, supra note 5, art. 9 (referring to "the responsibility
of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III").
49. Id. art. 4.
50. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.CJ.
595, 32 (July 11).
51. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.4/Add.3 (1998).
52. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 25(1).
1999]
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Forces. 53
The punishments suitable for juristic persons are evidently
not the same as those that can be imposed on natural persons.
The Nuremberg trials sought an order to declare the organiza-
tions "criminal. ' 54 The Draft Statute for an International Crimi-
nal Court, which constituted the basis of the deliberations in
Rome, included (bracketed) proposals pertaining to the crimi-
nal liability of juristic persons for any of the crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC.55 Although those proposals were eventu-
ally abandoned because the Working Group responsible for the
drafting of the concerned provisions could not reach a consen-
sus, 51 it is worth noting the kind of penalties that proponents of
proposals for the criminal liability of juristic persons had in
mind:57 fines, dissolution, prohibition of the exercise of any ac-
tivities by the juristic person for a period to be stipulated by the
Court, closure of the premises used in the commission of the
crime for a period to be determined by the Court, forfeiture of
proceeds, property and assets obtained by means of the criminal
conduct, and appropriate forms of reparation.
B. Actus Reus
The means of achieving the purposes of genocide include
killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately in-
flicting certain conditions of life on the target group, taking
measures to prevent births within the group, and forcibly trans-
ferring children of the target group from the target group.
These acts evidently must not be seen in isolation but, to consti-
tute acts of genocide, must be committed as a means of achiev-
ing the purpose of genocide, namely the destruction of the tar-
get group. The element of fault as circumscribed in the defini-
tion can, on the other hand, bring the proscription of genocide
to bear on a great variety of specific conduct that would almost
inevitably come within the reach of the broad confines of the
actus reus. In the 1993 Case Concerning Application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
53. See TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 1, at 80-84, Appendix B.
54. Id.
55. Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/2/Add.1 (1998), art. 23(5)-(6).
56. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.4/Add.3 (1998).
57. Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 76.
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& others v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), the "acts of geno-
cide and genocidal acts" complained of included, and was ex-
pressly not confined to,
murder; summary executions; torture; rape; mayhem; so-
called 'ethnic cleansing'; the wanton devastation of villages,
towns, districts and cities; the siege of villages, towns, districts
and cities; the starvation of the civilian population; the inter-
ruption of, interference with, and harassment of humanita-
rian relief supplies to the civilian population by the interna-
tional community; the bombardment of civilian population
centres; and the detention of civilians in concentration camps
or elsewhere.5"
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecu-
tor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu59 analyzed the different components of
the actus reus in some detail. The examples given of conduct
that would qualify as acts of genocide have evidently been in-
formed by the circumstances that prevailed in Rwanda at the
time. Different circumstances might render other examples,
and those outlined hereafter must therefore not be seen as ex-
haustive or even necessarily representative of genocidal conduct.
1. Killing Members of the Victim Group
The Tribunal noted that "killing" could mean intentional
and unintentional homicides, but that such a broad meaning
ought not to be given to that word as contemplated in the defini-
tion of genocide. The French text speaks of "meurtre" (murder),
which more accurately depicts the true intention of drafters of
the Genocide Convention. "Killing" within the meaning of ge-
nocide should therefore be taken to denote "homicide commit-
ted with the intent to cause death."6"
2. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the
Victim Group
In the Eichmann Case, the District Court of Jerusalem, in its
judgment of December 12, 1961, noted that serious bodily or
mental harm of members of a group could be caused
58. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Prose-
cution of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Others v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro)), 1993 I.C.J. 1 (April 8).
59. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T.
60. Id. 500.
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by the enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution
... [of members of the group] and by their detention in ghet-
tos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions
which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation
or their rights as human beings, and to suppress them and
cause them inhumane suffering and torture.6 1
Taking its lead from this exposition of the law, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda decided that "serious bodily or
mental harm ... [includes but is not limited to] acts of torture,
be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment,
persecution."62
3. Inflicting on the Victim Group Conditions of Life
Calculated To Bring About Its Physical Destruction in
Whole or in Part
Such action would include "subjecting a group of people to
a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the re-
duction of essential medical services below minimum require-
ment."63 The Cuban delegation at the Rome Conference re-
minded that it could also consist of the "economic, financial and
commercial blockade intentionally causing great suffering or se-
riously injuring physical integrity or mental or physical health."64
4. Imposing Measures Intended To Prevent Births Within the
Victim Group
Here, again, the wrongful conduct can include a broad vari-
ety of acts, such as "sexual mutilation, the practice of steriliza-
tion, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibi-
tion of marriages."65 The Tribunal went on to say:
In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is de-
termined by the identity of the father, an example of a mea-
sure intended to prevent births within a group is the case
61. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18,
238, 1 199 (Dist. Ct. of Jerusalem, Isr. 1961).
62. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 507.
63. Id. 505.
64. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Court, Proposal for Article 5 Submitted by Cuba, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/C.1/L.17 (1998). The Cuban proposal to include such blockades in the
definition of crimes against humanity for purposes of ICC jurisdiction ratione materiae
fell on deaf ears.
65. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 506.
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where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately
impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to
have her give birth to a child who will consequently not be-
long to its mother's group .... [R] ape can be a measure
intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses
subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a
group can be led, through threats of trauma, not to procre-
ate. 66
In some communities, loss of virginity or extra-marital preg-
nancy as such disqualifies the woman from the prospect of mar-
riage, and rape becomes a potent means of genocide in such
67communities.
5. Forcibly Transferring Children of the Victim Group to
Another Group
This component of the actus reus must again not be under-
stood in the physical sense only, but also includes "acts of threats
or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of children
from one group to another."68 An interesting analogy that
might be considered in this regard derives from apartheid South
Africa: due to the inferior status to which people of color where
institutionally condemned by the system, sometimes persons of a
less privileged (colored) racial group who could, by virtue of
their physical appearance, be mistaken for belonging to the priv-
ileged (white) population group, would desert their next-of-kin,
move to another part of the country, and assume the identity
and status of the privileged group. The question here would be
whether the transfer to the other population group could in
these circumstances be said to have occurred "forcibly," espe-
cially because the government establishment did not encourage
the infiltration of its "white domain" in this way. On the other
hand, appearance in terms of South Africa's racial classification
laws was an important consideration that could influence the ra-
cial registration authorities to designate the racial classification
of individuals, and it is well known that families were often sepa-
66. Id. 506-07.
67. See Sharon A. Healey, Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 327, 338-40 (1995); Siobhdn K. Fisher,
Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide, 46 DuKE L.J. 91, 93, 123-24
(1996).
68. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 508.
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rated in South Africa because of one member of the family being
classified as "white" and the other as "colored." The analogy
might in the end not be applicable due to the component of
special intent that qualifies the actus reus in cases of genocide.
C. The Victims of Genocide
Genocide is directed against a group of people, not against
individuals per se. As stated in Akayesu, "the victim is chosen not
because of his individual identity, but rather on account of his
membership of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group."69
The judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda in the case against Akayesu is in this regard instructive in
two respects: it defines each one of these group entities; and it
lays the foundation for extension of the target groups by means
of analogical interpretation. 0
1. National, Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Groups
In the Nottebohm Case, the International Court of Justice de-
fined nationality as "a legal bond having its basis [in] a social fact
of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and
duties."' In Akayesu, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda accordingly decided that a "national group" comprises
"a collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond
based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights
and duties."7 2 A national group is eine Nation (une Nation), in
contradistinction to ein Volk (un Peuple). Ethnicity, on the other
hand, is a cultural concept, denoting "a group whose members
share a common language or culture 73 (ein Volk, un Peuple).74
A racial group is conventionally defined on basis of "the he-
reditary physical traits often identified with a geographical re-
gion, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious fac-
69. Id. 520.
70. Id. The Tribunal did not actually rely on the rules of analogical interpretation
but arrived at the same result in deference to the travaux priparatoires of the Genocide
Convention.
71. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4,
23 (Apr. 6).
72. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 1 511.
73. Id. 512.
74. See also Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25
INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 102, 103 (1976).
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tors."7 5 South African apartheid racist laws did not define race
as a concept. Instead, they applied different criteria to allocate a
racial classification to persons subject to their decrees. Being
"white" depended on a persons appearance and general accept-
ance by other members of the community,7 6 whereas being a Na-
tive/Bantu/Black/African depended on belonging to an aborig-
inal race or tribe of Africa. 7 Most instructive was the definition
of "coloured person", i.e., "a person who is not a white person or
a native.""
Finally, a religious group is "one whose members share the
same religion, denomination or mode of worship."7 9 For pur-
poses of genocide, one could-it is submitted-avoid the per-
plexities attending the concept of "religion."8" Subjecting a
group claiming to be a religious community to any of the mani-
festations of the actus reus with the intent to effect its destruction,
in whole or in part, constitutes genocide, irrespective of the
group's self identification as a "religious community"-as will ap-
pear in the following paragraph.
2. Genocide with Respect to Groups not Expressly Mentioned
in the ICC Statute
The Genocide Convention did not specify all the groups
that are potential victims of action designed to destroy them.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu is precisely a case in point. The distinction
between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda falls between the cracks.81
These two factions of the Rwandan population shared the same
nationality, race, and by and large, the same religion. They
could not be classified as distinct ethnic groups: they share the
75. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 513.
76. §1 (1) of Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 (S. Mr.).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 514.
80. Those perplexities appear, for example, in a recent South African case, Witt-
mann v. Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria and Others, identifying "religion" with a "system
of faith and worship" as "the human recognition of superhuman controlling power and
especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship." The judg-
ment then mentions 'Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Buddhist and other faiths practicing
their religion...." as instances of religious communities. Buddhism is, however, a non-
theistic religion and would therefore not qualify as a "religion" under above circum-
scription. Wittmann v. Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria and Others, 1998 (4) SA 423
(T), at 449 (South Africa 1998).
81. Magnarella, supra note 6, at 530.
1999]
304 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:286
same language and culture. The divide is based on material
means (cattle owners and the other) and social status in the
community.
A strictly positivistic approach might lead to the conclusion
that only persons falling precisely in any of the categories men-
tioned by name in the Genocide Convention could be victims of
the crime of genocide as perceived in international law. Amy
Ray thus entertained the view that perpetrators of gender-spe-
cific violence inflicted on women in the former Yugoslavia could
not be prosecuted under the rubric of genocide8 2 since "gender
is not a group identity sufficient to invoke the laws against geno-
cide."8" The judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, luckily, did not follow this restricted line of reason-
ing.
Although the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
proceeded on the assumption that the Hutu and Tutsi consti-
tuted different ethnic groups, it must have been well aware that
this assumption was contradicted by its own definition of ethnic-
ity.84 Perhaps for that reason, it decided in the negative on the
question of whether the four categories mentioned in its Statute
(which are identical to those in the Genocide Convention and
the ICC Statute) constituted a numerus clausus.85
The tribunal came to this conclusion in deference to the
travaux priparatoires of the Genocide Convention. The reasoning
of the tribunal, however, also highlights general principles of law
pertaining to the extension of the reach of a statutory enactment
by means of analogical interpretation. The tribunal perhaps
avoided relying on analogical interpretation because of con-
straints generally recognized in its application to criminal law,
founded on the adage nullum crimes sine lege.
Matthew Lippman argued that the Genocide Convention
should be applied (or amended) to afford protection to "any
coherent collectivity which is subject to persecution," including
"political groups and possibly women, homosexuals, and eco-
82. Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and
the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REv.
793, 821 (1997).
83. Id. at 822.
84. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 512.
85. Id. 514.
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nomic and professional classes." 6 The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda less generously confined the extended
reach of the Genocide Convention's protection to "'stable'
groups, constituting in a permanent fashion and membership
... which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more
'mobile' groups which one joins through individual voluntary
commitment, such as political and economic groups."87 The key
conception here is that group members belong to the group on
an involuntary basis, or-in the words of the judgment-"auto-
matically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable man-
ner."88 In the vernacular of Dutch legal philosopher Herman
Dooyeweerd (1894-1977), the common denominator of the four
group entities mentioned in the definition of genocide is that
they all represent "institutional communities ... which by their
inner nature are destined to encompass their members to an in-
tensive degree, continuously or at least for a considerable part of
their life, and such in a way independent of their will."89 Prosecu-
tor v. Akayesu is authority for the proposition that action of the
kind mentioned in the definition of genocide, intended to de-
stroy a group of people not expressly mentioned in the defini-
tion but which shares this attribute of being "institutional" as de-
fined by Dooyeweerd, will indeed constitute genocide.
A group that comes to mind in this regard is the homosex-
ual community. Concerns were raised at the Rome Conference
by some delegates lest the ICC Statute might be interpreted to
afford protection to gays and lesbians. As a result, a rather silly
definition of "gender" was inserted in the Statute,9 ° partially to
lay those "fears" to rest. Those concerns, however, will not pre-
clude extension of the definition of genocide to protect persons
constituting an "institutional community" by virtue of their sex-
86. Lippman, supra note 3, at 464; see also Thomas W. Simon, Defining Genocide, 15
WIsC. INT'L L.J. 243, 244-47 (1999) (arguing that any collection of people, perceived by
perpetrators of mass killings as group to be exterminated, ought to qualify as victims of
genocide).
87. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 1 510; see also Magnarella, supra note 6,
at 529-31.
88. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, [ 510.
89. HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, III, A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT 187
(1984).
90. See ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 7(3) (stating that "[flor the purpose of this
Statute, it is understood that the term 'gender' refers to the two sexes, male and female,
within the context of society. The term 'gender' does not indicate any meaning differ-
ent from the above.").
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ual orientation. Subjecting someone to ridicule or contempt
merely on account of their (involuntary) gender-based orienta-
tion is as much a crime against humanity as was condemnation
of persons to an inferior status in public life because of their
(involuntary) racial extraction under the South African
apartheid system. Killing such people, or causing serious bodily
or mental harm to them, or deliberately inflicting on them con-
ditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction
in whole or in part, or forcibly transferring children of the gay
and lesbian community to another group, with the intent to de-
stroy that community in whole or in part, is as much an act of
genocide as was the slaughtering of Tutsi by the Hutu commu-
nity of Rwanda.
There is much to be said for the view that a customary-law
concept of genocide is much broader than the definition of that
crime contained in the Genocide Convention. Acts of the kind
mentioned in the convention targeting a group not falling
within the narrow categories expressly mentioned or impliedly
included in the convention's definition of genocide would nev-
ertheless be genocide under customary international law, pro-
vided that genocidal intent can be demonstrated. Accordingly,
Beth Van Schaack argues that the extermination of political
groups, though deliberately excluded from the Genocide Con-
vention definition of genocide, is punishable as an act of geno-
cide under customary international law." However, jurisdiction
of international criminal tribunals, including the ICC, is limited
to the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide. There-
fore, prosecutions for genocide under customary international
law in cases falling outside that definition can only occur in mu-
nicipal criminal courts.
D. Mens Rea
The element of fault prescribed for the crime of genocide is
a variety of dolus specialis and as such qualifies the acts through
which genocide is committed: the act must be committed "with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such." 2 Intent can take on one of three
91. Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Conven-
tion's Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259 (1997).
92. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 6.
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forms:
* dolus directus, in which event the wrongful consequences
of the act were foreseen and desired by the perpetrator
(A desires the death of B and foresees that his act will
bring about B's death: if A in these circumstances com-
mits the act and B dies in consequence of that act, then A
will be judged to have acted with direct intent to kill B);
* dolus indirectus, in which event certain (secondary) conse-
quences in addition to those desired by the perpetrator of
the act were foreseen by the perpetrator as a certainty,
and although the perpetrator did not desire those secon-
dary consequences he/she nevertheless committed the
act and those consequences did set in (A desires the
death of B and foresees that if he were to put poison in
B's food, other guests at B's table will most certainly also
die; knowing that C will be joining B for dinner, A never-
theless poisons the food and in so doing causes the death
of both B and C; in regard to the death of C, A acted with
indirect intent); and
" dolus eventualis, in which event the perpetrator foresaw
consequences other than those desired as a possibility
(not a certainty) and nevertheless went ahead with the act
(A desires the death of B and foresees that if he were to
shoot B while B is driving his car, other passengers in the
car may possibly also be injured or even killed; if A never-
theless goes ahead and shoots B while B is driving the car
with C as his passenger, A will be held liable for the inju-
ries, or the death, of C under the rubric of dolus eventualis
even though he might not have wished C any harm).
Dolus eventualis differs from negligence. In the case of dolus
eventualis, the perpetrator foresaw the (secondary) consequences
that might result from the wrongful act. In the case of negli-
gence, he/she did not foresee those consequences while a rea-
sonable person would have been expected to foresee the possi-
bility of those consequences resulting from the wrongful act. In
Anglo/U.S. legal systems, dolus eventualis is usually defined as a
manifestation of fault in cases where the perpetrator acted "reck-
lessly" with regard to the (undesired) consequences of his/her
act. In legal systems where "recklessness" features prominently
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in the circumscription of fault, the distinction between dolus
eventualis and negligence becomes blurred.
Special intent as an element of genocide will be confined to
dolus directus. The "mental element" of crimes within the juris-
diction of the ICC-which apply "[u]nless otherwise pro-
vided"-requires that the material elements of the crime must
have been committed "with intent and knowledge. 93 In relation
to the consequences of the unlawful act, intent is defined as re-
quiring that "[the] person means to cause [the] consequence or
is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events."9 4
Knowledge, in turn, is only present if "awareness that... a conse-
quence will occur in the ordinary course of events" can be
demonstrated. 5 The verb used in these passages, "will occur,"
includes dolus directus and dolus indirectus, but not dolus eventualis.
However, the special nature of genocide, particularly its compo-
nent of "intent to destroy," leaves no scope for liability for the
principal act in cases of dolus indirectus. Destruction of the group
will always be the primary objective of the principal perpetrator,
while dolus indirectus applies to secondary consequences beyond
those actually desired by the perpetrator. Dolus indirectus can,
however, lead to a conviction in cases of complicity in genocide.
Due to the requirement of special intent, there is also no
place for versari in re illicita in the international law prohibition
of genocide. Regarding the versari doctrine, a person commit-
ting a wrongful act is responsible for all harmful consequences
of the act-those brought about by his/her act as well as those
ensuing from the act of someone else-irrespective of his/her
fault regarding those other consequences. For example, if A
robs a grocery store, and B, the shop owner, fires a shot at the
robber, misses, and accidentally hits and kills his own wife, the
versari rule provides that the robber can be held criminally liable
for the death of B's wife.96 The versari rule is frowned upon in
legal systems where criminal liability is strictly based on fault in
respect of the harmful consequences of the criminal act.97 The
93. Id. art, 30(1).
94. Id. art. 30(2)(b).
95. Id. art, 30(3).
96. For a discussion and application of the versari-rule in the United States, see
Jackson v. State, 408 A.2d 711 (Md. 1979).
97. See, e.g., R. v. Martineu, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (Can.) (striking down § 213(a) of
Canadian Criminal Code (R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34), which had sanctioned versari rule).
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requirement of special intent for the crime of genocide, as well
as the circumscription in the ICC Statute of the "mental ele-
ment" as a precondition for criminal liability,98 clearly excludes
versari in re illicita.
This also applies to the requirement in some criminal jus-
tice systems of malice as, supposedly, a constituent element of
intent for purposes of criminal liability for certain offenses. Mal-
ice is a component of the motive that prompted certain conduct
and is not an ingredient of fault. Intent-a certain manifesta-
tion of fault-deals with the guilty knowledge of the perpetrator:
what did the perpetrator of the act contemplate with his/her act;
did he/she foresee the consequences of his/her act, either as a
certainty or as a possibility? Malice, on the other hand, ad-
dresses the question of why the perpetrator acted wrongfully.
Malice can of course serve as proof of intent, and it can be taken
into account as an aggravating circumstance that would influ-
ence the sentence imposed by the criminal court. It is not, how-
ever, a component of intent as such. Intentional homicide is not
necessarily motivated by malice, ill-will, or spite, but might even
be prompted by compassionate, perhaps noble, considerations,
i.e., the case of euthanasia. There are a few isolated offenses of
which malice is essentially a requirement-not as a manifesta-
tion of intent but as a distinct element in its own right of the
offense-for example in the case of malicious prosecution, or in
the case of murder with malice aforethought as a special cate-
gory of criminal homicide.
Although malice is not a distinct element of the crime of
genocide, by virtue of the very nature of genocide, it invariably
attends the commission of that crime. Thus, malice has impor-
tant evidentiary value in cases of genocide.
Proving (special) intent on the part of the accused is always
difficult. In Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic (Rule 61), the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia noted that
special intent to commit genocide may be inferred from a
number of facts, such as
the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts ...
or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts ....
the pepretration of acts which violate, or which the perpetra-
tors themselves consider to violate, the very foundation of the
98. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 30.
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group-acts which are not in themselves covered by the list in
... [the definition of genocide] but which are committed as
part of the same pattern of conduct.99
In the case of Akayesu, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda decided that:
it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a par-
ticular act charged from the general context of the prepara-
tion of other culpable acts systematically directed against the
same group, whether these acts were committed by the same
offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of
atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systemat-
ically targeting victims on account of their membership of a
particular group, while excluding the members of other
groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent
of a particular act.'00
The objective of genocide as embodied in the requirement
of special intent, on the one hand, limits the kind of acts that
would constitute genocide. On the other hand, the objective of
genocide can also serve to bring into the confines of the actus
reus a broad perception of killings, bodily or mental harm, that
inflicts conditions of life, prevents births, and transfers children.
For example, killing members of the target group might be pre-
ceded as part of the process of destruction of the target group-
and therefore as a constituent component of the actus reus-by
mental torture or rape.
Depicting rape as "a form of genocide directed specifically
at women"' 0 ' has a certain emotional appeal, but cannot serve as
a directive for purposes of the juridical meaning of genocide.
Rape can, however, become a constituent part of genocide pro-
vided it is committed as part of the genocidal actus reus and with
genocidal intent.
The judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda in Akayesu illustrates the point. The tribunal decided
that "rape and sexual violence . . . constitute genocide in the
same way as any other act as long as they were committed with
99. Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic (Rule 61), Cases Nos. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-
18-R61, 108 I.L.R. 86 (1998), T 94 (July 11, 1996).
100. jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 522.
101. Catharine A. McKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
59, 65 (1993).
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the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular
group, targeted as such."'01 2 In the special circumstances of that
case, rape and sexual violence were committed as "an integral
part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi wo-
men and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the
destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole."'0 3 Rape and sexual
violence per se are indeed not genocide, but where the physical
and mental violence committed against women, selected for that
purpose by reason of their group affiliation, are committed with
genocidal intent, they become part of the actus reus and there-
fore punishable as acts of genocide.
It is also important to note that the Tribunal gave a broad
definition of sexual violence and rape:
The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual
nature, committed on a person under circumstances which
are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which
includes rape, as any act of a sexual nature which is commit-
ted on a person under circumstances which are coercive.
Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the
human body and may include acts which do not involve pene-
tration or even physical contact. The incident ... in which
the Accused ordered the Interahamwe 0 4 to undress a stu-
dent and force her to do gymnastics naked in the public
courtyard of the bureau communal, in front of a crowd, con-
stitutes sexual violence. The Tribunal noted in this context
that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show
of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other
forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may consti-
tute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain cir-
cumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence
of Interhamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau
communal. 10
5
The General Assembly of the United Nations on several oc-
casions also addressed the advent of rape and sexual violence
committed by, among others, members of the Serbian Forces
against Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina as "a deliber-
ate weapon of war in fulfilling the policy of 'ethnic cleansing,"'
102. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 729.
103. Id.
104. Id. 689. This refers to "armed local militia."
105. Id. 686.
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holding that such acts constituted instances of genocide. 10 6
E. Complicity in Genocide
The ICC Statute makes no explicit mention of liability for
complicity in the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction
of the ICC, as does the Statute of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia" 7 and the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.'0 8 It does, however,
render an accomplice liable in certain narrowly defined circum-
stances. Having defined the liability of the principal actor(s) for
any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the ICC Stat-
ute extends jurisdiction of the ICC ratione personae to include
someone who:
[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or at-
tempted commission of such crime by a group of persons act-
ing with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be in-
tentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity
or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or
purpose involves the commission of a crime within the ju-
risdiction of the Court or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group
to commit the crime.10 9
Incitement to commit a crime is only a competent sentence in
the case of genocide."10
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda held that genocide and complicity in genocide are
mutually exclusive: one cannot be convicted of both crimes if
106. G.A. Res. 192, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 225, 3, U.N. Doc. A/
50/49 (1995); see also G.A. Res. 121, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 44, U.N.
Doc. A/47/49 (1992); G.A. Res. 143, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 263, U.N.
Doc. A/48/49 (1993); G.A. Res. 205, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 226, U.N.
Doc. A/49/49 (1994).
107. See Statute of the International Tribunal, supra note 15, art. 4(3) (rendering
punishable genocide, as well as conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public in-
citement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in geno-
cide).
108. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 16, art. 2(3)
(rendering punishable genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public in-
citement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in geno-
cide).
109. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 25(3)(d).
110. Id. art. 25(3)(e).
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the conviction is based on the same act.1 1' Complicity in geno-
cide necessarily implies the existence of the principal act of ge-
nocide;1 2 but that does not mean that an accomplice can only
be tried if the principal perpetrator has been identified and con-
victed." '
Complicity can consist of (i) instigating; (ii) aiding and
abetting; or (iii) procuring the means for committing the princi-
pal act." 4 In Prosecutor v. Tadic (Judgment), the International
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia decided in this regard:
The Trial Chamber finds that assisting and abetting includes
all acts of assistance by words or acts that lends encourage-
ment or support, as long as the requisite intent is present.
Under this theory, presence alone is not sufficient if it is an
ignorant or unwilling presence. However, if the presence can
be shown or inferred, by circumstantial or other evidence, to
be knowing and to have a direct and substantial effect on the
commission of the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to
base a finding of participation and assign the criminal culpa-
bility that accompanies it.
In sum, the accused will be found criminally culpable for any
conduct where it is determined that he knowingly partici-
pated in the commission of an offense ... and his participa-
tion directly and substantially affected the commission of that
offense through supporting the actual commission before,
during, or after the incident.' 15
A prime example of incitement to commit genocide, re-
ferred to in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, may be gleaned from the facts
attending the conviction in the Nuremberg Trials of Julius
Streicher, editor-in-chief between 1932 and 1945 of the anti-Se-
mitic newspaper, Der Stiirmer. Streicher was convicted of crimes
against humanity, because at the time of the Nuremberg Trials
genocide had not yet been identified for indictment purposes as
a distinct crime under international law. Today, however, he
would most likely have been convicted of incitement to commit
111. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-964-T, J 531, 698, 723.
112. Id. 1 526, 529.
113. Id. 530.
114. Id. 532, 536.
115. Prosecutor v. Tadic (judgment) (Case No. IT-94-I-T), 112 I.L.R. 2 (1999), 1
689, 692 (May 7, 1997).
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genocide, or perhaps, on the basis of dolus directus on his part, t16
even of participating in the crime of genocide through aiding
and abetting. In convicting the accused (of a crime against hu-
manity), the Nuremberg Tribunal observed:
Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the
time when Jews in the East were being killed under the most
horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on polit-
ical and racial grounds in connection with War Crimes, as de-
fined in the Charter, and constitutes a Crime against Human-
ity.
1 1 7
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the International Tribunal for
Rwanda sought at some lengths to distinguish between aiding
and abetting as an accomplice in the crime of genocide, and partic-
ipating in the crime of genocide through aiding and abetting.
The distinction between an accessory or accomplice (particeps
criminis) and a concurrent wrongdoer (socius criminis) seems to
be the point in issue here.
The accomplice must have knowledge of the genocidal in-
tent of the principal actor,1 8 but need not share the desire to
destroy, in whole or in part, the national, ethnical, racial, or reli-
gious group targeted by the perpetrators of genocide." 9 Tran-
scribed into the technical vernacular alluded to earlier, the Tri-
bunal was saying that dolus indirectus will suffice to render an ac-
cused punishable as an accessory. The Tribunal further
expressed the opinion that complicity by aiding and abetting will
always require a positive act (a mere omission will not do). 2 1
For the aider and abetter to be a socius criminis-a partici-
pant in the principal act-he/she must act with the specific
genocidal intent (dolus directus) ;12 and here-according to the
116. Streicher clearly had knowledge of the extermination of Jews and in several
editorials expressed strong support for their persecution.
117. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 1, at 549.
118. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 537.
119. Id. 538-40, 543-44, 724.
120. Id. 535.
121. Id. 546. In paragraph 724, the Tribunal stated that participation in the
crime through aiding and abetting will attract individual responsibility for the crime of
genocide "in particular" where the accused had the specific intent to commit genocide.
The words in quotation marks suggest that the specific intent to commit genocide is not
essential in this case. If that is what the Tribunal sought to convey in paragraph 724,
then the statement contradicts its earlier exposition of the law. In the author's opinion,
the words "in particular" in paragraph 724 must be taken to be no more than sloppy
formulation-which, by the way, is overall not uncommon in the written judgment. Id.
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Tribunal-the actus reus (the planning, preparation, or execu-
tion of genocide) could consist of an omission.'2 2 The Tribunal,
however, referred for support to the English case of The Queen v.
Coney, where on the contrary it was decided, in the words of
Hawkins, J., that "to constitute an aider or abettor some active
steps must be taken by word, or action, with the intent to insti-
gate the principal, or principals."' 23 Coney actually dealt with
aiding and abetting by an accomplice, and reference to that case
in the context of participation in a crime as a co-perpetrator was
therefore entirely out of place.
F. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
Deviations in the jurisprudence of international tribunals
from the exact wording of the Genocide Convention raise the
question as to the measure of precision with which an offense
need to be defined in order to satisfy the demands of nullum
crimen sine lege.
In countries with an uncodified system of (criminal) law,
some flexibility normally applies as far as common law crimes
are concerned. The Nuremberg tribunals followed this prece-
dent. In The Hostage Case,'24 Judge Edward F. Carter, reading
the first part of the judgment, observed:
Any system of jurisprudence, if it is to be effective, must be
given an opportunity to grow and expand to meet changed
conditions. The codification of principles is a helpful means
of simplification, but it must not be treated as adding rigidity
where resiliency is essential. To place the principles of inter-
national law in a formalistic strait-jacket would ultimately de-
stroy any effectiveness that it has acquired. 125
Judge Carter went on to say:126
It is not essential that a crime be specifically defined and
724. See also R. v. Jefferson, (1994) 1 All E.R. 270 (CA), at 280 (holding that "[a]n
aider and abettor [by encouragement] ... is aware of and party to the requisite intent
of the principal offender").
122. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, 547.
123. The Queen v. Coney, 8 QBD 534 (1882).
124. 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. VON LIST & OTHERS, TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUEREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10, NUEREMBERG OCTOBER 1946 TO APRIL 1949 757 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1950).
125. Id. at 1235.
126. Id. at 1239.
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charged in accordance with a particular ordinance, statute, or
treaty if it is made a crime by international convention, recog-
nized customs and usages of war, or the general principles of
criminal justice common to civilized nations generally. If the
acts charged were in fact crimes under international law
when committed, they cannot be said to be ex post facto acts or
retroactive pronouncements.'
27
M. Cherif Bassiouni was therefore perfectly right in saying
that the same standard of specificity required for the circum-
scription of criminal offences by some criminal justice systems
does not apply in international law.' 28 Jordan Paust even went so
far as to express doubt whether the Nuremberg Tribunals re-
garded nullum crimen sine lege to be a principle of international
law. 129
The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court pre-
pared by the ILC 3 ° did not contain definitions of the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the proposed International Criminal
Court. The ILC's preference was for confining the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the ICC to crimes that have been de-
fined in treaties in force, but adding those ones that would be
defined in the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Se-
curity of Mankind, 1 ' which the ILC was in the process of
127. It has been noted that the Nuremberg tribunals applied ex post facto laws be-
cause the crimes with which the German war criminals were charged had been defined
in a Control Council Law after the event. See Bryan MacPherson, Building an Interna-
tional Criminal Court for the Twenty-First Century, 13 CONN.J. INT'L L. 1, 9, 10. (1998). The
Nuremberg tribunals maintained, however, that the charges were based on pre-existing
rules of customary international law derived from international conventions, customs
and usages of war, and general principles of criminal justice recognized by "civilized
nations." See VON LIST & OrHERS, supra note 124, at 1239. It might be noted in passing
that the Nuremberg indictments did not comply with the concomitant norm requiring
the competent punishments to have been sanctioned by law (nulla poena sine lege). See
T.B. Murray, The Present Position of International Criminal Justice, 36 GROTIuS TRANSAC-
TIONS 191, 196-97 (1950); Thomas H. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction
and the Threatened Trials of American Airmen, 15 Lov. L. REV. 43, 51-52 (1968-69); William
A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 ALB. L. REV.
733, at 735 (1997).
128. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity ': The Need for a Specialized Con-
vention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 469 (1994).
129. Jordan J. Paust, Its No Defence: Nullum Crimen, International Crime And the
Gingerbred Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657, 666 (1997).
130. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 46th Session, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 29, U.N. Doc A/49/10 (1994).
131. ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
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drafting.132
At the early stages of the deliberations in New York, some
delegations insisted on incorporating in the ICC Statute defini-
tions of all the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee (1995) recorded the concerns
that prevailed in this regard:
As regards the specification of crimes, the view was expressed
that a procedural instrument enumerating rather than defin-
ing the crimes would not meet the requirements of the prin-
ciple of legality (nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine
lege) and that the constituent elements of each crime should
be specified to avoid any ambiguity and to ensure full respect
for the rights of the accused.' 33
It is not impossible that some delegations that insisted on
precise definitions of crimes were using the argument as a lever
to delay, and perhaps prevent, the establishment of the ICC.
However, there was in the end little that could be said in support
of not defining the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC with
as much precision as international compromises and the con-
straints of language would permit. Nullum crimes sine lege is a
sound principle of criminal justice and evidently includes within
itself a high degree of legal certainty as to the precise meaning
and constituent components of each crime. Nullum cimen sine
lege and nulla poena sine lege soon came to be generally accepted
as the norm that ought to trump arguments of expediency and
urgency.3 4
The strategies considered as a means of satisfying the de-
mands of nullum crimes sine lege included incorporating the defi-
nitions contained in various treaties into the ICC Statute
through cross-references, taking definitions from the Nurem-
berg Charter and the Statutes of the International Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and elaborating those defini-
tions for purposes of the ICC, or urging the ILC to finalize its
drafting of the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
132. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 44th Session, Report of
the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 145, 167, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992).
133. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
134. See Leila Sadat Wexler, Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, and
Complementarity, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 221, 224-25 (1997).
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Mankind'35 and using the Code as a definitional basis for the
jurisdiction of the ICC ratione materiae.'36 In the end, those refin-
ing the ICC Statute saw fit to include definitions of the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC in the ICC Statute itself.
The ICC Statute therefore affords express sanction to the
principles of nullum crimen sine lege1 37 and nulla poena sine lege,131
meticulously defines the crimes within the jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 3 ' and ensures that the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the ICC cannot be extended to crimes before
such crimes are defined in the ICC Statute.
140
As indicated above, the interpretation of the definition of
genocide in recent jurisprudence of international tribunals ex-
ceeds the bounds of the language used in the Genocide Conven-
tion-and mimicked in subsequent international instruments-
for example, by extending the protection afforded to target
groups to include all institutional groups (those whose member-
ship are not exclusively determined by voluntary entry into and
exit from the group), such as gay and lesbian communities.
Since the definition of genocide in the ICC Statute is identical to
the one subjected to such extensive interpretation, and in spite
of the emphasis in the ICC Statute on legal certainty and the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, it is to be expected that the
ICC will follow this broad interpretation of the crime of geno-
cide. The ICC is also expressly authorized to prosecute persons
who directly and publicly incite others to commit genocide, 4 ' as
well as those who aid, abet, or otherwise assist in the commission
or attempted commission of the crime of genocide.'42 For pur-
poses of the ICC, the dispute as to the liability of states for geno-
cide will on the other hand be of no consequence as far as ICC
jurisdiction is concerned, since the jurisdiction rationepersonae of
the ICC has been confined to natural persons only.
135. ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
136. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 133, 57.
137. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 22.
138. Id. art. 23.
139. Id. arts. 6-8.
140. Id. arts. 5(2), 22-23.
141. Id. art. 25(3)(e).
142. Id. art. 25(3)(c).
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II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The principle of universality of "offenses generally recog-
nized as of universal concern" affords jurisdiction to any state,
"regardless of the situs of the offense and the nationalities of the
offender and the offended."'43 Offenses against customary law
of a peremptory nature,144 including treaty obligations that have
become part of customary international law,'45 constitute crimen
contra omnes and can as such be prosecuted in any state on behalf
of the international community. Universal jurisdiction trumps
the principle of territoriality, which in general determines the
jurisdiction of courts of law in criminal matters: crimes subject
to universal jurisdiction may be punished by any state in custody
of the offender, irrespective of the place where the offense was
committed. 146
It should be noted that several international conventions in-
corporated the principle of universal jurisdiction for prosecu-
tion of crimes to which they relate by mandating State Parties to
either extradite a suspect in its custody or to assert jurisdiction
over that suspect, irrespective of where the crime was commit-
ted.147 It is interesting to note that the Genocide Convention
143. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L.
REv. 785, 788 (1988).
144. See Jordan J. Paust, Universality and the Responsibility To Enforce International
Criminal Law: No US Sanctuary for Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 11 HOUSTONJ. INT'L L. 337
(1989).
145. JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 293
(1996).
146. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 36, at 469-70; 2 M. CHERIF BAS-
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 31-33 (1986); Murray, supra note 127, at 194-95;
Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1139-41 (1982);JordanJ. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterrito-
rial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violaters of International Law Under the
ESIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 211-15 (1983); Jeffrey Allan
McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Terrorism: The United States Response to Achille
Lauro-Questions of Jurisdiction and Its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 435, 439
(1986); Hans Corell, Nuremberg and the Development of an International Criminal Court, 149
MIL. L. REv. 87, 90 (1995); Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Univer-
salJurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153,
165-66 (1996); Paust, supra note 39, at 95-96; MacPherson, supra note 127, at 3-4;Jelena
Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and
Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 321 (1998); Van Schaack, supra note 91,
at 2278-80.
147. See, e.g., Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, art. 4(2), 22 U.S.T. 1641, 1645; Montreal Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civilian Aviation (Sabotage),
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does not base its jurisdictional provisions on the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction-at least not as far as prosecutions in the na-
tional courts of a State Party is concerned' 48 However, few to-
day would deny that genocide clearly qualifies as violations erga
omnes within the meaning of the doctrine of universal jurisdic-
tion. '49 Kenneth Randall argued that universal jurisdiction with
respect to genocide under customary international law can co-
exist with the principle of territoriality as a matter of treaty
law.15 In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugosla-
via (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional Measures, Judge Lauter-
pacht likewise held that the definition of "genocide" in Article 1
of the Genocide Convention was intended "to permit parties,
within the domestic legislation that they adopt, to assume univer-
sal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide-that is to say, even
when the acts have been committed outside their respective ter-
ritories by persons who are not their nationals.""'
Those who deny the feasibility of universal jurisdiction for
the prosecution of acts of genocide, regrettably, included the
delegation of the United States at the Rome Conference, which
opposed the Rome model for the establishment and functioning
of the ICC and condemned the international law principle of
universal jurisdiction. In the intervention at the Rome Confer-
Sep. 23, 1971, art. 5(2), 24 U.S.T. 565, 570; Convention on the Suppression and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, art. 5, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244, 246; Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 3(2), 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1979;
International Convention Against Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, art. 5(2), 18
I.L.M. 1456, 1458; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 5(2), 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028, as modified
in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
148. See Genocide Convention, supra note 5, art. 6 ("Persons charged with geno-
cide ... shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act
was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with re-
spect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction."); see also
Van Schaack, supra note 91, at 2268, 2277-78.
149. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996
I.C.J. 595, 31 (July 11); David Stoelting, Status Report on the International Criminal Court,
3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SVMp. 233, 249 (1999).
150. Randall, supra note 143, at 837; see also A.R. Carnegie, Jurisdiction over Viola-
tions of the Laws and Customs of War, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 402, 408-09 (1963).
151. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)),
Provisional Measures, 1993 l.C.J. 325, 443, 110 (Sept. 13).
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ence of the U.S. delegation on July 13, 1998 pertaining to a pro-
posal put forward by the Bureau of the Conference, 52 its spokes-
person said:
We must object very strongly and in principle to this option,
because the language effectively incorporates universal juris-
diction for the crime of genocide .... We are sympathetic to
the goal of ensuring prosecution for genocide, but we cannot
support this way of achieving it. This option reaches beyond
the treaty parties to subject non-parties to the Court's jurisdic-
tion ....
A. Historical Perspective
It seems clear that the notion of universal jurisdiction
originated from a need to bring pirates and brigands 53 to jus-
tice 15 4-though it should be noted that brigands were prose-
cuted under municipal laws and not under the law of nations.
Why exactly the urge to combat piracy gave birth to the principle
of universality has become a matter of controversy. 155 There
does, however, seem to be a simple explanation: pirates prac-
ticed their evil trade on the high seas, which are beyond the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of any state; and purely for practical reasons,
the high seas were therefore, for purposes of jurisdiction, re-
garded not as res nullius but as res omnium communes.156 In the
152. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Bureau Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59
(1998). The Bureau Proposal was submitted to the Committee of the Whole with a view
to narrowing down the issues in an attempt to reach consensus before time would run
out.
153. See Sponsler, supra note 127, at 44 (defining brigands as "men often traveling
in quasi-military gangs, often veterans of a particular campaign, who rove the country-
side plundering and disrupting the peace and security of the area").
154. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 113 (8th ed., 1866);
Sponsler, supra note 127, at 44; Joyner, supra note 146, at 165-66.
155. Sponsler, supra note 127, at 45. Thomas Sponsler mentions several proposed
justifications for this development in international law: (1) piracy was regarded as an
offense against the law of nations; (2) pirates were perceived to be the enemies of all
mankind and therefore anyone could capture and prosecute them; (3) historically, uni-
versal jurisdiction to prosecute piracy grew out of established practices of criminality; or
(4) the universality principle emerged fortuitously from uniform state practices in deal-
ing with piracy.
156. See 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, II, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 951-52 (1906);
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 154 (1957); Willard B. Cowles, Universal-
ity ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177, 193 (1945); MacPherson, supra
note 127, at 3; see also Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 19, 13 U.S.T.
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Lotus Case, Judge Moore (dissenting), having endorsed the prin-
ciple of universality with regard to piracy, went on to say:
[A]s the scene of the pirate's operations is the high seas,
which is not the right or duty of any nation to police, he is
denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is
treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind-hostis
humani generis-whom any nation may in the interest of all
capture and punish.
1 7
The ratio of its origin might be relied upon by opponents of
the concept of universality to protest the extension of its applica-
tion to instances where crimes are not committed in no-man's
land. The emphasis, however, has shifted from the purely for-
mal to the substantive legitimization of universal jurisdiction. 5 '
In Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, the court defined the current norm that
supports, and at the same time confines, its application:
The "universality principle" is based on the assumption that
some crimes are so universally condemned that the perpetra-
tors are the enemies of all people. Therefore, any nation
which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them ac-
cording to its law applicable to such offenses.'5 9
The criterion for application of the principle of universal
jurisdiction must accordingly be sought in the heinous nature of
the crime (of which its dimensions are an element) and not so
much in the absence of territorial jurisdiction of nation states
with regard to the locality of the crime. The extension of the
principle of universality to war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity was accordingly solidified by the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials, 6 " since the establishment of the post-War tribunals and
their proceedings was clearly based on the principle of universal
jurisdiction.161
2312, 2317, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 92; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Dec. 10, 1982, art. 105, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1289.
157. The Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. Ser. A. (Judgments) No. 10
(udgment No. 9) (1929).
158. See Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and
the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 279 (1988) (referring in
this context to "offences that because of their nature are of concern to all states").
159. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
160. Sponsler, supra note 127, at 49-50,
161. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
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B. Endorsement of Universal Jurisdiction by National Courts
The principle of universal jurisdiction has indeed been ap-
proved and applied in the jurisprudence of many countries. For
example, in 1950, in the trial of General Wagener, the Supreme
Military Tribunal of Italy had this to say:
These norms [concerning crimes against laws and customs of
war], due to their highly ethical and moral content, have a
universal character, not a territorial one.
The solidarity among nations, aimed at alleviating in the best
possible way the horrors of war, gave rise to the need to dic-
tate rules which do not recognize borders, punishing
criminals wherever they may be.
Crimes against the laws and customs of war.., are... crimes
of lMse-humaniti (reati di lesa umanitd) and, as previously
demonstrated, the norms prohibiting them have a universal
character, not simply a territorial one. Such crimes, there-
fore, due to their very subject matter and particular nature
are precisely of a different and opposite kind from political
offenses. The latter generally concern only the States against
whom they are committed; the former concern all civilized
States, and are to be opposed and punished, in the same way
as the crimes of piracy, trade of women and minors, and en-
slavement are to be opposed and punished, wherever they
may have been committed.
16 2
The principle of universal jurisdiction was also raised in Israel in
the case against Adolph Eichmann. It was there stated that:
the interest in preventing and punishing acts belonging to
the category in question [crimes against humanity]-espe-
cially when they are perpetrated on a very large scale-must
necessarily extend beyond the borders of the State to which
the perpetrators belong and which evinced tolerance and en-
couragement of their outrages; for such acts can undermine
the foundations of the international community as a whole
and impair its very stability.
1 63
In France, an objection raised by Klaus Barbie on grounds
162. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 419, 482 (Int'l Criminal Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, 1995) (internal citations omitted).
163. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 279 (S. Ct. of Isr.,
1962).
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that he had been the victim of "disguised extradition"'' 64 was dis-
missed by the Chambre dAccusation of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber) quoted with approval
the following statement of the Court of Appeals: "[B]y reason of
their nature, the crimes against humanity ... do not simply fall
within the scope of French municipal law but are subject to an
international criminal order to which the notions of frontier and
extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign." 65
In the United States, in the case of Demjanjuk v Petrovsky,
universal jurisdiction was also directly in issue. Israel sought the
extradition from the United States of Demjanjuk to stand trial in
that country for war crimes and crimes against humanity com-
mitted by him as a Nazi official in Poland. Demjanjuk opposed
the application inter alia on the grounds that Israel had no juris-
diction to prosecute crimes committed outside its geographical
boundaries. Having asserted that international law recognized
universal jurisdiction over certain crimes,' 66 the court decided
that the fact that Demjanjuk was to be charged with having com-
mitted the criminal acts in Poland did not deprive Israel of au-
thority to bring him to trial.
According to Jordan Paust, universal jurisdiction over inter-
national crimes has been recognized in the United States since
"the dawn of ... [its] history."' 167 The United States has certainly
since early times recognized the power of its courts to prosecute
persons for acts of piracy,168 and by participating in the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo trials, it has recognized the validity of universal
164. Klaus Barbie had been sentenced to death in absentia by the 71ibunal Penna-
nent des Forces Armes de Lyon for atrocities committed while he was head of the Gestapo
in Lyon in the period 1942-44. France traced his presence to Bolivia, which refused to
extradite him to France. Bolivia subsequently deported Barbie to French Guiana,
where he was arrested on arrival and taken to France.
165. Fdration Nationale des D~port~s et Intern~s R~sistants et Patriotes v.
Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125, 130 (Fr. Ct. of Cassation (Criminal Chamber) 1985).
166. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
167. Paust, supra note 146, at 211.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820). This case
states:
the general practice of all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or
foreigners, who have committed this offense [of piracy] against any persons
whatsoever, with whom they are in amity, is a conclusive proof that the offense
is supposed to depend, not upon the particular provisions of any municipal
code, but upon the law of nations, both for its definition and punishment.
Id. See also United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551) (stating that "no one can doubt, that vessels and property in the posses-
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jurisdiction with respect to at least war crimes and crimes against
humanity.169 U.S. courts often refer with approval to the princi-
ple of universality with regard to crimes other than piracy."')
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
is quite explicit in this regard:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment
for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations
as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on
or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps
certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of ju-
risdiction . . .is present. 171
In Canada, the case of Regina v. Finta is of special impor-
tance in this regard. 7 2 Imre Finta was prosecuted in Canada for
atrocities committed against 8617 Jews in Szeged, Hungary, be-
tween May 16 and June 30 of 1944, including unlawful confine-
ment, robbery, kidnapping, manslaughter, and deportation to
death camps in Auschwitz and Strap3hof. Although Finta was ac-
quitted (La Forest,J., dissenting), the principle of universal juris-
diction with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity
was confirmed by the court.
Section I I(g) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, 1982, provides that any person charged with an offense
has the right:
not to be found guilty on account of any act or omission un-
less, at the time of the commission of the act or omission, it
constituted an offence under Canadian or international law
or was criminal according to the general principles of law rec-
ognized by the community of nations.' 73
sion of pirates may be lawfully seized on the high seas by any person, and brought in for
adjudication").
169. Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 583.
170. See, e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1967) (conspir-
acy); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (terrorism);
Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 581-83 (crimes against humanity); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.
Supp. 896, 900-01 (D.D.C. 1988) (aircraft piracy and hostage taking).
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987).
172. Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 513 (1994); see, e.g.,
Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 171, 245-49
(1997); Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 457, 472-73 (1998).
173. Constitution Act 1982, C.R.C., ch. 11, § 1 (1982) (Can.).
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The principle of universality inherent in this provision was more
restrictively regulated in Sections 7(3.71)-(3.77) of the Canadian
Criminal Code. Those provisions confined the jurisdiction of
Canadian courts to punish acts or omissions committed outside
the territorial boundaries of Canada to (i) war crimes and crimes
against humanity, (ii) committed by a citizen of, or a person em-
ployed in, a state which is at war with Canada, or, alternatively,
committed against a Canadian citizen or a citizen of an ally of
Canada in the armed conflict. The Criminal Code further re-
quires that the accused be present in Canada and that the act or
omission, had it been committed in Canada, would have consti-
tuted an offence under the laws of Canada.
The specific factor that gives a crime the international di-
mension of universality, according to Justice La Forest, emerges
whenever "it is of direct concern to the international community
and may be prosecuted wherever the alleged offender may be
found."'7 4 Justice Cory (in whose judgment Gonthier and Ma-
jor, JJ. Concurred) also alluded to the principle of universal ju-
risdiction, as an exception to the rule of territoriality, citing an
Australian publicist in support of the proposition that the princi-
ple of universality is based upon "the accused's attack upon the
international order as a whole and is of common concern to all
mankind as a sort of international public policy." '75
The principle of universal jurisdiction also featured promi-
nently in the proceedings in Spain and in England against Gen-
eral Augusto Pinochet. An actio popularis'76 brought by a group
of private individuals against Pinochet for offenses of genocide,
torture, and terrorism committed in Chile during the period
when the accused was President of that country (1973-1990)
culminated in a 285-page indictment, issued by Judge Garzon of
Spain on December 10, 1998. The judge based Spain's compe-
tence to prosecute Pinochet for crimes committed in Chile (not
necessarily against Spanish citizens) on the principle of universal
174. Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. at 752, 112 D.L.R. at 547.
175. Gillian Triggs, Australia's War Crimes Trials: A Moral Necessity or Legal
Minefield?, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 382, 389 (1987-1988).
176. See C.E. art. 125 (1978) (Sp.) (mandating that "[c]itizens may exercise popu-
lar action and participate in the Administration ofJustice .... "); see also L. E. CRIM., art.
270 (Sp.) (mandating that "[a]ll Spanish citizens, whether or not they are victims of the
crime, may file an action, by exercising the popular action . . ."). As to actiones populares
in general, see J.D. van der Vyver, Actiones Populares and the Problem of Standing in Roman,
Roman-Dutch, South African and American Law, in ACTAJURIDICA 191 (1978).
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jurisdiction as embodied in Spanish statutory law177 (since Spain
has a codified system of law, the jurisdiction of a Spanish court
must find its base in the written law of the country).
While Pinochet was undergoing medical treatment in Eng-
land, a request of Spain for his extradition was received by the
British authorities. The proceedings in the British courts were
largely focused on the question of whether Pinochet was entitled
to immunity for crimes committed while he was the head of
state, and eventually how the principle of "double criminality"-
which forms part of British extradition law-would play itself out
insofar as charges proferred against Pinochet based on allega-
tions of torture, murder, and conspiracy to murder were con-
cerned.178 Application of the principle of universal jurisdiction
had a decisive influence on the final judgment.
The House of Lords decided 179 that, as far as both civil and
criminal liability is concerned, a head of state enjoys absolute or
complete immunity while he remains in office (immunity ratione
personae). 80 At common law,1 81 heads of state forfeit personal
immunity on ceasing to serve in that capacity,1 12 but still cannot
177. See L.O.P.J., Ley orgdnica 6/1985, de 1 de Julio, art. 23(4) (a) (b) (Sp.) (au-
thorizing criminal jurisdiction of Spanish courts "although the offense may have been
committed outside of the national territory, if committed by a national or a foreigner,"
provided offense is codified in Spanish law).
178. The Home Secretary indicated that he would not consider extradition of Pi-
nochet on charges of genocide.
179. R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & Others, Ex Parte Pi-
nochet Ugarte (No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L.) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3)].
180. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718-19 (9th
Cir. 1992); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
181. The common law position has been written into the laws of the United King-
dom. The Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 was enacted to give effect to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES ACT (U.K., 1964 c.81). By
virtue of the State Immunity Act of 1978, the provisions of the Diplomatic Privileges Act
also apply to "a sovereign or other head of state." STATE IMMUNITYAcT, art. 20(1) (U.K.,
1978 c.33).
182. See Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States,
Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 88 (1994-III) (stat-
ing that "former Head of State is entitled ... to none of the facilities, immunities and
privileges which international law accords to Heads of States in office."). A former
head of state can be sued on his/her private obligations. See Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v.
Christian Dior, S.A.R.L., 24 I.L.R. 228 (Fr. Ct. App. of Paris 1957) (holding ex-King
Farouk of Egypt not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction of French courts after abdi-
cation); see also Socihth Jean Desshs v. Prince Farouk, 65 I.L.R. 37 (Trib. de Grande
Instance of the Seine 1963) (holding that, though debts were contracted before abdica-
tion, ex-King cannot prevent French creditors from suing him in French courts, since
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be sued for acts performed in their official capacity while they
were heads of state (immunity ratione materiae) .' Criminal con-
duct is not necessarily excluded from the range of official func-
tions of a head of state,184 and the House of Lords was also not
prepared to exclude torture committed before the Torture Con-
vention of 1984'85 entered into force from "official functions" of
the head of state18 6 so as to exclude the operation of immunity
ratione materiae.'8 7 It is clear, however, that following the enter-
ing into force of the Torture Convention for a particular state,
the head of that state cannot claim immunity ratione materiae for
acts that fall within the criminal proscriptions of the conven-
tion. 18 8
The principle of double criminality requires that the
sovereign immunity had disappeared). Immunity ratione materiae will also not be of any
avail to a former head of state for private or criminal acts. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Aris-
teguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212
(lth Cir. 1997). See also OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 36, 456.
183. See Hatch v. Baez, 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596, 600 (1876) (discussing immunity of
former President of Dominican Republic for official acts); see also Watts, supra note 182,
at 88-89 (comparing "acts of state" to Head of State's personal acts); OPPENHEIM'S INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, supra note 36, 1 456.
184. See Marcos v. Federal Dept. of Police, 102 I.L.R. 198, 203-04 (Switz. Fed. Trib.
1989) (holding that, although former President of Philippines was immune for criminal
acts committed while in office, U.S. courts could institute proceedings against him be-
cause State of Philippines expressly waived immunity).
185. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, supra note 147.
186. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (decid-
ing that although official torture by agents of state is prohibited by international law as
matter ofjus cogens and can therefore not be recognized as sovereign act, prosecution
for such acts of torture in another country is nevertheless excluded under norms per-
taining to immunity materiae personae).
187. The House of Lords in this respect overruled its earlier decision in R. v. Bow
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998]
4 All. E.R. 897 [1998] 37 I.L.M. 1302 (H.L.) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.
1)] (deciding, with Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Lloyd of Berwick dissenting, that
Pinochet cannot claim immunity ratione materiae for criminal acts committed while he
was in office). The latter judgment was set aside by the House of Lords on the basis of
the principle nemo iudex idoneus in propria causa est, because the connections of one of
the Law Lords with Amnesty International, which had an interest in the case, had not
been disclosed to the defense team. See R. v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 2), [1999] 1 All E.R. 577, 586-89 (H.L.) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 2) ]. The merits of the matter consequently had to be reconsidered. See Ex
Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), supra, at 577.
188. Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), supra note 187. Lord Goff of Chieveley
(dissenting) supported the dissenting opinions of Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Lloyd
of Berwick in Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1) that torture can qualify as an "official
functions" of a head of state. Id. He went on to find that the Torture Convention did
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crime (s) proferred by the requesting state against the person
whose extradition is sought must have been a crime in the re-
quested state (had the act been committed in that state) on the
date of the commission of the crime and not merely on the date
of the request for extradition (as had been held in the first
House of Lords decision). In virtue of the principle of double
criminality, the extradition of Pinochet can only be authorized
with respect to acts of torture' 89 committed after December 8,
1988-the date on which the United Kingdom ratified the Tor-
ture Convention. 190
As far as application of the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion to the law of England is concerned, the judgment in the
House of Lords is-to say the least-quite confusing. Lord
Browne-Wilkinson, for example, expressed the view that "[t]he
jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture justifies
states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever com-
mitted"'' and that "long before the Torture Convention of 1984
state torture was an international crime in the highest sense. "192
Yet, Lord Browne-Wilkinson was not prepared to accept that acts
of torture, as rendered punishable by customary international
law (which forms part of English common law), could be prose-
cuted in British courts (by virtue of the principle of universal
jurisdiction) prior to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act
of 1988. And since the absence of a tribunal to prosecute the
customary-law prohibition of torture was tendered as the reason
why, in spite of the customary proscription of torture, acts of
torture could indeed be part of "official functions" of the head
of state for purposes of immunity ratione materiae, this flaw in his
reasoning had a decisive influence on the outcome of the case.
not exclude immunity ratione materiae for acts of torture committed by a former head of
state as part of his/her official functions. Id.
189. Charges relevant to hostage-taking do not meet the requirements of double
criminality because, in terms of the Taking of Hostages Act of 1982, a threat to "kill,
injure or continue to detain the hostage" as a means of intimidating others to do or to
refrain from doing something is an essential component of the offense. No such
threats were alleged against Pinochet. Taking of Hostages Act 1982, art. 1 (b) (U.K.,
1982 c.28). See Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), supra note 187.
190. The torture provision of the British Criminal Justice Act of 1988 entered into
force on 29 September 1988. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, art. 134 (U.K., 1988 c.36)
(crime of torture). Lord Hutton preferred that date to be decisive for extradition pur-
poses. See Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), supra note 179, at 164.
191. Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), supra note 179, at 109.
192. Id.
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Lord Hutton likewise postulated that "acts of torture were
clearly crimes against international law and that the prohibition
of torture had acquired the status of jus cogens"a 9 -that is, prior
to the entering into force of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988.
He was not prepared, however, to concede universal jurisdiction
with respect to torture that preceded the provisions in the Tor-
ture Convention regulating universal jurisdiction." 4
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers also endorsed the validity
of universal jurisdiction in international law:
Since the 1939-45 war states have recognised that not all crim-
inal conduct can be left to be dealt with as a domestic matter
by the laws and the courts of the territories in which such
conduct occurs. There are some categories of crime of such
gravity that they shock the consciousness of mankind and can-
not be tolerated by the international community. Any indi-
vidual who commits such a crime offends against interna-
tional law. The nature of these crimes is such that they are
likely to involve the concerted conduct of many and liable to
involve the complicity of the officials of the state in which
they occur, if not the state itself. In these circumstances it is
desirable that jurisdiction should exist to prosecute individu-
als for such conduct outside the territory in which such con-
duct occurs. 195
According to Lord Phillips, however, uncertainties still exist as to
whether national courts can exercise universal jurisdiction in
cases not covered by conventions making provision for it, and
the national courts of Great Britain only acquired extra-territo-
rial jurisdiction to prosecute extra-territorial acts of torture after
the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 had become law. International
criminal tribunals, on the other hand, do have jurisdiction to
prosecute crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, and immunity
ratione materiae cannot be claimed by perpetrators of such crimes
when brought before an international criminal tribunal. State
immunity ratione materiae-in a word-cannot co-exist with inter-
national crimes and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Because the
acts allegedly committed by Pinochet cannot be classified as hav-
ing been committed "in performance of his functions as head of
193. Id. at 164.
194. See id.; see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 147.
195. Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), supra note 179, at 188.
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state" for purposes of immunity ratione materiae, Pinochet can be
prosecuted for "so much of the conduct alleged against [him] as
constitutes extradition crimes."1 96
Lord Millett dealt with the principle of universal jurisdiction
at some length, and quite admirably, citing, inter alia, the Eich-
mann Case,'97 and noting that "[t]he way in which a state treated
its own citizens within its own borders had become a matter of
legitimate concern to the international community. '  For uni-
versal jurisdiction to be applicable, he said, two basic require-
ments must be satisfied:
First, they [the crimes] must be contrary to a peremptory
norm of international law so as to infringe a jus cogens. Sec-
ondly, they must be so serious and on a scale that they can
justly be regarded as an attack on the international legal or-
der. 199
Lord Millett went on to say that English courts can find ju-
risdiction on the common law and customary international law
(which is part of the common law), "and accordingly . . . the
English courts have and always have had extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion in respect of crimes of universal jurisdiction under custom-
ary international law."'200 He was further of the opinion that "the
systematic use of torture on a large scale and as an instrument of
state policy had joined piracy, war crimes and crimes against
peace as an international crime of universal jurisdiction well
before 1984.11201 Lord Millett therefore concluded that, already
in 1973, British courts did possess extraterritorial jurisdiction to
try cases of torture and conspiracy that had been committed on
the scale mentioned in the indictment against Pinochet and that
the courts "did not require the authority of statute to exercise
it."2° 2 But having said all of that, he decided to conform to the
majority opinion, holding that Pinochet cannot be extradited
for crimes committed before the Criminal Justice Act of 1988
196. Id. at 192.
197. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (1968) (S. Ct. of Isr.
1962).
198. Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), supra note 179, at 177.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 178.
202. Id.
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came into force (on September 29, 1988) 2°-but not without
reminding the reader once again that "[flor my own part, I
would allow the appeal in respect of the charges to the offences
in Spain and to torture and conspiracy to torture wherever and
whenever carried out. 20 4
C. Endorsement of Universal Jurisdiction by International Tribunals
The Trials of German and Japanese war criminals following
World War II were based on the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion. The Nuremberg Tribunal noted that the Signatory Powers,
in creating the tribunal, in defining the law to be applied by the
tribunal, and in making regulations for the proper conduct of
the trials, "have done together what any one of them might have
done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the
right thus to set up special courts to administer law."20 5 In com-
menting on this statement, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations said: "It is possible and .. .probable that the Court
considered the crimes under the Charter to be, as international
crimes, subject to the jurisdiction of every State. ' 20 6
The opinion of the Secretary-General is, of course, not con-
clusive evidence of an intention to endorse the extended appli-
cation of the principle of universal jurisdiction to crimes, which
at the time had not been included in the universality paradigm;
that is, to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 207 Several
judgments of war crime tribunals established by the United
States and Great Britain, however, expressly based their jurisdic-
tion-at least in part or alternatively to other jurisdictional
grounds-on the principle of universal jurisdiction. 20 8
In the Hostage case, the U.S. Military Tribunal encapsulated
the jurisdictional principle as follows: "An international crime is
... an act universally recognized as criminal, which is considered
a grave matter of international concern and for some valid rea-
son cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state
203. Indeed, this was not the decisive date reflected in the opinions of the plurality
that constituted concurrence in the final outcome of the case.
204. Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), supra note 179, at 180.
205. 1 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 1, at 218.
206. SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBU-
NAL: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 80 (1949).
207. See Randall, supra note 143, at 806.
208. See id. at 804-10; see also Lippman, supra note 172, at 238-340.
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that would have control over it under ordinary circum-
stances."20 9 In the Hadamar Trial, the U.S. Military Commission
subscribed to:
the general doctrine recently expounded and called "univer-
sality of jurisdiction over war crimes," which has the support
of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and accord-
ing to which every independent State has, under Interna-
tional Law, jurisdiction to punish not only pirates but also war
criminals in its custody, regardless of the nationality of the
victim or of the place where the offence was committed, par-
ticularly where, for some reason, the criminal would other-
wise go unpunished.21 °
In the Trial of Lothar Eisentrdger & Others, the U.S. Military Com-
mission echoed this view:
A war crime . . . is not a crime against the law or criminal
code of any nation, but a crime against the jus gentium. The
laws and usages of war are of universal application, and do
not depend for their existence upon national laws and fron-
tiers. Arguments to the effect that only a sovereign of the
locus criminis has jurisdiction and that only the lex loci can be
applied, are therefore without foundation. 211
The British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals
formulated the universality bases of its jurisdiction as follows:
That under the general doctrine called Universality of Juris-
diction over war crimes, every independent state has in Inter-
national Law jurisdiction to punish pirates and war criminals
in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victim or the
place where the offence was committed.212
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia also emphatically endorsed the principle of universal juris-
diction. In the case against Dusko Tadic, the Trial Chamber ob-
served:
the crimes which the International Tribunal has been called
209. VON LIST & OTHERS, supra note 124, at 1241.
210. The Hadamar Trial (Alfons Klein & Others), 1 L. Rep. Trials War Crimes 46,
53 (U.S. Mil. Comm., Wiesbaden 1945).
211. Trial of Lothal Eisentrager & Others, 14 L. Rep. Trials War Crimes 8, 15 (U.S.
Mil. Comm., Shanghai 1947).
212. The Almedo Trial (Otto Sandrock & Others), 1 L. Rep. Trials War Crimes 35,
42 (Almedo, Netherlands 1945); see also The Zyklon B. Case (Bruno Tesch & Others),
I L. Rep. Trails War Crimes 93, 103 (Hamburg 1946).
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upon to try [crimes against humanity and grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions] are not crimes of a purely domestic
nature. They are really crimes which are universal in nature,
well recognized in international law as serious breaches of in-
ternational humanitarian law, and transcending the interest
of any one State. The Trial Chamber agrees that in such cir-
cumstances, the sovereign rights of States cannot and should
not take precedence over the right of the international com-
munity to act appropriately as they affect the whole of man-
kind and shock the conscience of all nations of the world.
There can therefore be no objections to an international tri-
bunal properly constituted trying these crimes on behalf of
the international community.
21 3
This statement of the law was confirmed in the Appeals
Chamber, where the court went on to say: "Borders should not
be considered as a shield against the reach of the law and as a
protection for those who trample underfoot the most elemen-
tary rights of humanity. ' 2
1 4
In Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia endorsed the principle of
universal jurisdiction in the case of torture:
it would seem that one of the consequences of the jus cogens
character bestowed by the international community upon the
prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investi-
gate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused
of torture, who are present in a territory under its jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the one hand to
prohibit torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally
unfettered treaty-making power of sovereign States, and on
the other hand bar States from prosecuting and punishing
those torturers who have engaged in this odious practice
abroad. This legal basis for States' universal jurisdiction over
torture bears out and strengthens the legal foundation for
such jurisdiction found by other courts in the inherently uni-
versal character of the crime. It has been held that interna-
tional crimes being universally condemned wherever they oc-
cur, every State has the right to prosecute and punish the au-
213. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 420, 441, 42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former
Yugoslavia 1997).
214. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 453, 483, 58 (Appeals Chamber 1997). This
case also endorsed the principle of universal jurisdiction as enunciated in Wagener and
Eichmann. Tadic, 105 I.L.R. 481-83, 57.
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thors of such crimes. As stated in general terms by the
Supreme Court of Israel in Eichmann,215 and echoed by the
USA court in Demjanjuk,2 16 "it is the universal character of the
crimes in question i.e., international crimes which vest in
every State the authority to try and punish those who partici-
pate in their commission."2 1 7
The International Court of Justice also subscribed to the
principle of universal jurisdiction, and more in particular with
regard to genocide. In Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia, it re-
ferred to a passage in the Case on Reservations to the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 2 1 emphasizing the universal character of the crime of ge-
nocide to make the point: "It follows that the rights and
obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights and obliga-
tions erga omnes. The Court notes that the obligation each State
thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not
territorially limited by the Convention. 219
It thus seems clear that every state has the right-and in-
deed a duty-to bring to justice in its municipal courts perpetra-
tors of genocide in its custody, irrespective of the locality where
the acts of genocide occurred. It must be emphasized, though,
that implementation of the principle of universal jurisdiction in
any particular state will depend on the constitutional and crimi-
nal justice system of that state. In countries where customary
international law is self-executing and enjoys precedence over
nationally enacted law, the courts of the country can exercise
universal jurisdiction without further ado. That will also apply to
states where international law is self-executing but subordinate
215. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. of Isr. 1962).
216. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
217. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. 317, 1 156 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Former Yugoslavia 1999).
218. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Part II (Resolutions), U.N. Doc. A/64/
Add.1 (1947); see also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 14, 23 (May 28); Case Concerning Applica-
tion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 1 (April
8); Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 348 (Sept. 13).
219. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.CJ.
595, 616 (July 11).
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to statutory law of the country and where there is no statute that
would prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by the national courts
with respect to international crimes subject to universal jurisdic-
tion. Other countries might have written the principle of territo-
riality into the laws regulating their criminal procedure and
would therefore require a special statutory exception to that rule
in the case of international crimes that qualify for universal juris-
diction. Countries with a codified system of (criminal) law
might require that the universal jurisdiction of their courts be
incorporated into the written law. International tribunals will
not be subject to any such constraints.
III. PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
We have established thus far that genocide is included in
the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC, that only natural per-
sons (to the exclusion of juristic persons, including states) can
be prosecuted for acts of genocide in the ICC, that genocide has
come to be regarded as a crime contra omnes and as such is sub-
ject to universal jurisdiction, and that constitutional constraints
that might hamper implementation of the principle of universal-
ity in some municipal criminal justice systems are never an obsta-
cle in the case of international tribunals. The next passages will
show that universal jurisdiction nevertheless will not be applied
to its full extent in the ICC, and that the jurisdiction of the ICC
is complementary to that of municipal criminal justice systems.
Additionally, considerations of state sovereignty cannot legiti-
mately be raised to contest the propriety, or the defacto exercise,
ofjurisdiction by the ICC. Last, the ICC Statute includes several
safeguards against frivolous prosecutions.
A. Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the ICC
The principle of universal jurisdiction, if fully applied,
would afford inherent jurisdiction to the ICC 220 with regard to
all the crimes within its subject-matter jurisdiction. A proposal
to that effect, submitted by Germany, was in the end not adopted
220. Inherent jurisdiction denotes "the power to hear cases without receiving an
express grant of authority." Patricia A. McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balanc-
ing the Principle of Sovereignty Against the Demands for International Justice, 12 ST. JoHN's J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 535, 553 (1997).
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by the Rome Conference. As a compromise, the ICC Statute lays
down the following "Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdic-
tion":
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby ac-
cepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes
referred to in article 5.
2. In the case of... [a referral by a State Party or where the
Prosecutor initiated an investigation], the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Par-
ties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in ques-
tion occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a
vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or
aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this
Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by dec-
laration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise ofjuris-
diction by the Court with respect to the crime in question.
The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without
any delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.221
As a general rule, therefore, jurisdiction of the ICC is not depen-
dent on the nationality of the accused, and because all the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are subject to universal
jurisdiction, a state cannot shield the prosecution of its citizens
by not ratifying the ICC Statute.
If a case has been referred to the ICC by the Security Coun-
cil, 2 2 2 then the court has inherent jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute the matter. The Security Council can refer a matter to
the ICC in the circumstances stipulated in Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, for example where the Security
Council decides that a situation constitutes a "threat to the
peace, [a] breach of the peace, or [an] act of aggression. 223
This situation will almost invariably be the case where acts of ge-
nocide appear to have been committed.
221. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 12.
222. See id. art 13(b).
223. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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If the case has been referred to the ICC by a State Party224
or the prosecutor conducted the investigation proprio motu,2 25
then the ICC Statute simply requires that either the state in
whose territory the crime was committed (the territorial state) or
the nation state of the accused must have accepted the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC before the court can exercise jurisdiction in such
cases. If neither of those two states have ratified the ICC Statute,
then either of them can trigger the jurisdiction of the court by
lodging a declaration with the Registrar of the ICC, the mecha-
nism through which the ICC governs, with regard to the particu-
lar criminal act stipulated in the declaration. There are two ex-
ceptions to this general rule:
When ratifying the ICC Statute, a state can submit an opt-out
declaration pertaining to war crimes that will remain valid for
a period of not more than seven years as from the date on
which the ICC Statute becomes binding on that state. The
opt-out declaration does not only exclude the duty of the
State Party to cooperate with the ICC but also excludes the
jurisdiction of the Court over war crimes committed by a na-
tional of that State Party, or within its territory, during the
opt-out period for that State Party. 22
6
Should the ICC Statute be amended in the future to add any
crime (including the crime of aggression) 227 to the list of
crimes within the subject-matterjurisdiction of the ICC, it will
be open to States Parties to decline to accept that amend-
ment. In that event, the ICC will not have jurisdiction over
that crime if committed by a national, or within the territory,
of the State Party which has not accepted the amendment of
the Statute.228
The provision relating to war crimes creates a rather strange
224. See ICC Statute, supra note 11, arts. 13(a), 14.
225. See id. arts. 13(c), 15.
226. See id. art. 124.
227. In terms of the ICC Statute, the crime of aggression has been conditionally
included in the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC. For the ICC to exercise jurisdic-
tion with regard to acts of aggression, a definition of aggression and the conditions
under which the court can exercise jurisdiction with respect to that crime must first be
agreed upon and incorporated into the ICC Statute by means of, and in accordance
with the formalities prescribed for, an amendment of the ICC Statute. See id. arts.
5(1) (d), 5(2). Following the Rome Conference, the General Assembly of the United
Nations established a Preparatory Commission to prepare the next of certain outstand-
ing matters, including the elements of crimes. G.A. Res. 105, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, vol. 1, at 359, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (1998).
228. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 121(5).
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state of affairs: if a war crime has been committed by a citizen of
a state which is not a party to the ICC Statute, then the ICC can
nevertheless exercise jurisdiction with respect to that crime, pro-
vided only that the territorial state has either ratified the ICC
Statute or has made a declaration under Article 12(3) accepting
the exercise ofjurisdiction by the ICC with regard to that crime.
If, however, the state concerned does ratify the ICC Statute, then
it can make a declaration under Article 124 of the ICC Statute
excluding the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to war crimes
committed by any of its nationals or within its territory in the
period for which that declaration remains valid (which is limited
to a maximum of seven years from the date on which the Statute
becomes binding on that state).
In cases of genocide, it is almost unthinkable that a territo-
rial state or a nation-state would not at least on an ad hoc basis
agree to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. It is also almost
inconceivable that the Security Council would decline to refer a
case involving genocide to the ICC, but with the Security Coun-
cil one can of course never tell.2 29
B. The Principle of Complementarity
The Tenth Preambular Paragraph of the ICC Statute pro-
claims that "the International Criminal Court established under
this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdic-
tions." Article 1 of the ICC Statute mentions the principle of
complementarity as one of the cornerstones of the ICC regime.
Article 17, under the heading of "Issues of Admissibility," pro-
vides:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article
1, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which hasjurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has juris-
229. Jesse Helms, We Must Slay This Monster: Voting Against the International Criminal
Court Is Not Enough. The US Should Try to Bring It Down, FIN. TIMES, July 31, 1998, at 18.
It is perhaps worth noting that Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Senate
Special Committee on Foreign Relations, has expressed the resolve to seek assurances
from the Clinton administration that "the US will never ... allow its national security
decisions to be judged by an International Criminal Court."
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diction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute
the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for con-
duct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by
the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph
3;230
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further ac-
tion by the Court.23'
The point to be emphasized is that the competence to bring the
perpetrator(s) of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC tojus-
tice remains the prime responsibility of nation-states. Only if
states with jurisdiction in the matter are unwilling or unable to
prosecute, can the matter be referred to the ICC.
Governments, including that of the United States, who fear
that their officials or military personnel might become the target
of frivolous prosecutions in the ICC should take comfort in this
important principle of ICC jurisdiction. M. Cherif Bassiouni was
quite right in his assessment "that the concerns of the United
States are overstated and that the interests of the United States
in having a [sic] ICC far outweigh the marginal and far-fetched
concerns that have been articulated by political opponents of
the ICC. ' 23 2 As noted by Paul Marquardt, "[a]n international
criminal court is not likely to expend scarce political capital on
pointless and alienating attacks on great power policy, and it is
certainly not in the court's interest to do so. "233 The U.S. fears
have in any event been adequately refuted in a note by Jerome
Shestack and David Stoelting:
Portraying the ICC as a malleable tool that America's enemies
230. Article 20 deals with double jeopardy, and its Paragraph 3 stipulates instances
where the principle of non bis in idem will not apply, for example if the purpose of the
earlier trial was to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, or the proceedings were not conducted indepen-
dently or impartially in accordance with the rules of due process recognized by interna-
tional law.
231. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 17.
232. M. Cherif Bassiouni, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects: Confer-
ence Convocation, 13 Am. U. INT'L L. Rrv. 1400, 1403 (1998).
233. Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International
Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 144 (1995); see also Ruth Wedgwood,
Improve the International Criminal Court, in TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
53, 64 (1999).
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would utilize to further political means is also misleading and,
in fact, demeans U.S. Courts. In every instance, national
courts-and not the ICC-would be the preferred forum for
the trial of accused war criminals. Only if national courts were
either unavailable or ineffective 23 4 would the ICC proceed.
Obviously, the ability of U.S. courts to prosecute instances of
war crimes would obviate the need for trial of a U.S. citizen by
the ICC. Moreover, the draft treaty contains a number of
safeguards designed to minimize the possibility of any politi-
cally motivated prosecution. In addition, the United States, if
it ratifies the ICC treaty, would play a role in the selection of
judges and prosecutors of the highest integrity.235
It is important to note that the United States has been more
diligent than most other countries in condemning and prosecut-
ing members of its own armed forces who violated the norms of
humanitarian law.23 6 To this might be added that the United
States can in any event suspend the prosecution for war crimes
of U.S. nationals in the ICC-its main concern-for a period of
seven years; that is, on condition that it ratifies the ICC Statute,
and does so subject to a declaration to that effect. 237
C. Considerations of State Sovereignty
The ICC Statute in several respects implicates the sover-
eignty of states, not the least of which derives from competence
of the ICC to exercise jurisdiction if it considers a nation-state to
be "unwilling" to prosecute a person suspected of having com-
mitted a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC.238 Article
234. "Unavailable" and "ineffective" appeared in the Draft Statute that was under
consideration at the time the note was written. Those words became "unable" and "un-
willing" in the ICC Statute.
235. Jerome J. Shestack & David Stoelting, The International Criminal Court: Setting
the Record Straight, CICC MONITOR, July 16, 1998, at 3.
236. Jordan Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57
MIL. L. REv. 99, 118 (1972). Jordan Paust speaks of "the American commitment to
international law demonstrated in the long history of condemnations and prosecutions
of even our own soldiers and civilians." Id.
237. See ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 124.
238. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151,
160-65 (1992); Robert T. Mounts, War Crimes and Other Human Rights Abuses in the Former
Yugoslavia, 16 WH-ITIER L. REv. 387, 423-24 (1995); Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an
International Criminal Court in the 1990's, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 223, 234-35 (1992); Leila
Sadat Wexler, The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 665, 713-14 (1996).
1999]
342 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:286
17(2) of the ICC Statute circumscribes "unwillingness" as a pre-
condition for setting ICC jurisdiction in motion:
In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the
Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due
process recognized by international law, whether one or
more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding
the person concerned from criminal responsibility for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court .... ;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings
which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent
to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted
independently or impartially, and they were or are being
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person con-
cerned to justice. 239
Unwillingness also has a bearing on the principle of ne bis in
idem as defined in the ICC Statute. The rule against double
jeopardy reiterates that the trial of a particular person in a na-
tional court will not preclude the ICC from prosecuting the per-
son for conduct that constituted the basis of that trial240 if: (i)
the purpose of the proceedings in the national court was to
shield the person concerned from prosecution in the ICC for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the court, or (ii) those proceed-
ings were not conducted "independently or impartially in ac-
cordance with the norms of due process recognized by interna-
tional law" and it is furthermore demonstrated that the proceed-
ings were "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice. '"241
The ICC Statute thus affords to the ICC the authority to cast
a value judgment on the criminal justice systems of nation-states.
239. ICC Statute, supra note 1I, art. 17(2).
240. It might be noted that the international norm depicting the rule against
double jeopardy differs from the U.S. perception of that rule. In the United States,
double jeopardy only excludes a second trial for the same crime (a person convicted or
acquitted in a state court can again be tried for the same act in a federal court, or vice
versa), whereas the international standard of ne bis in idem excludes a second trial for the
same conduct.
241. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 20(3).
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The PrepCom's Report of 1996 recorded some concerns in this
regard:
It was noted that while the determination of "availability" of
national criminal systems was more factual, the determination
of whether such a system was "ineffective" 242 was too subjec-
tive. Such a determination would place the Court in the posi-
tion of passing judgement on the penal system of a State.
That would impinge on the sovereignty of national legal sys-
tems and might be embarrassing to that State to the extent
that it might impede its eventual cooperation with the
Court.
2 43
The sovereignty argument-"the underlying tension be-
tween state sovereignty and the need for international jus-
tice "244-was raised but never really stressed by any of the delega-
tions at the Rome Conference or pursued at great lengths. Little
could be said in support of states that would afford protection,
through sham trials or otherwise, to perpetrators of genocide or
other heinous crimes. Perhaps the governments represented in
New York and in Rome were also sensitive to the general decline
of the substantive enclave of state sovereignty in international
law.2 4' As noted by Patricia McKeon, " [t] he doctrine that a state
has absolute authority, independent of the affairs of other na-
tions is outdated and unrealistic, '246 and "tihere is a balance
between a society's right to its sovereignty and the right of the
international community to ensure punishment of criminal be-
242. Supra note 233 and accompanying text.
243. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, vol 1: Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During March-
April and August 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 38, 161, U.N. Doc. A/
51/22 (1996).
244. McKeon, supra note 220, at 549.
245. See J.D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and Inter-
national Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 321, 42041 (1991). Oppenheim argues that the
notion of sovereignty in the sense of "a supreme power and authority" is a constitu-
tional concept that cannot be applied to states within the international community. Id.
"No state has supreme legal power and authority over other states in general, nor are
states generally subservient to the legal power and authority of other states. Thus the
relationship of states on the international plane is characterised [sic] by their equality
and independence and, in fact, by their interdependence." Id., see also OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 36, at 125, 37.
246. McKeon, supra note 220, at 564; see also Bridge, supra note 36, at 225; Sandra
L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objec-
tions, 23 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 431-32 (1995).
1999]
344 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:286
havior for certain acts which otherwise would go unpunished. '24 7
Oppenheim likewise discarded the notion of absolute sover-
eignty in international relations, noting that "the very notion of
international law as a body of rules of conduct binding upon
states irrespective of their internal law, implies the idea of their
subjection to international law."248 This is borne out by the
Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
ILC in 1949, where it provides:
Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other
States in accordance with international law and with the prin-
ciple that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the
supremacy of international law.2 49
Paul Marquardt observed accordingly, with reference to the
Nuremberg Trials, that "an individual has a legal duty, on pain
of prosecution, to disobey his sovereign national government if
it attempts to violate certain international legal principles. '250
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia added its voice to the issue at hand in
the case against Dusko Tadic:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal
need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be
allowed to be raised successfully against human rights.2 51
Jelena Pejic argued that inherent jurisdiction of the ICC
should not be viewed as an encroachment on state sovereignty,
because "states are free to become parties to the statute and will
be guided by sovereign will in making that determination. 25 2
The point is not altogether well-taken. Although the duty to co-
operate with the ICC is treaty-based, that does not apply to the
submission of nationals of any particular state to the criminal law
proscriptions of customary international law. Karl Vasak, in de-
fining the special characteristics of international human rights
247. McKeon, supra note 220, at 564.
248. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 36, at 125, 37; see also Murray,
supra note 127, at 193-94; Marquardt, supra note 232, at 142.
249. Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States (1949), art. 14, reprinted in
THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION 165-67 (5th ed. 1996).
250. Marquardt, supra note 233, at 142.
251. Prosecutor v. Tadic (Jurisdiction) [(Appeals Chamber 1995)] 105 I.L.R. 453,
483, 58.
252. Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 291, 321 (1998).
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law, 253 noted that while, conventionally, the binding effect of
general international law was commonly believed to derive from
consent and agreement-that is, express agreement in the case
of treaty law and tacit agreement in the case of customary inter-
national law-international human rights law can be made ap-
plicable to a state as a matter of compulsion and on an involun-
tary basis.25 4 Vasak also noted that international human rights
law is not dependent on the principle of reciprocity255 but postu-
lates entitlements and obligations erga omnes.256 There can no
longer be any doubt that persons committing crimes under in-
253. Karel Vasak, Le Droit International des Droits de l'Homme, 140 RECUEIL DES
CouPs 333, 404-09 (1974-IV).
254. Id. at 407-09.
255. The principle of non-reciprocity was first enunciated in the opinion of the
European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Austria v. Italy, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
Hum. Rts. 116, 138 (1961) (noting that, in relation to High Contracting Parties, pur-
pose of European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was not
"to concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in pursuance of their indi-
vidual national interests but to realize the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe...
to establish a common public order"). See also id. at 140 (depicting obligations under
European Convention of Human Rights as "essentially of an objective character, being
designed rather to protect the fundamental rights of individual human beings from
infringement by any High Contracting Parties than to create subjective and reciprocal
rights for High Contracting Parties themselves"). In Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32, 11 33-34, the International
Court of Justice endorsed the principle, in an obiter dictum, that "[s]uch obligations
derive from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the prin-
ciples and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination" and amount to obligations erga omnes. Belgium v.
Spain, supra. In the 1971 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia(South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 56, 126, the ICJ confirmed-
this time around as a matter of ratio decidendi-the notion of obligationes erga omnes ema-
nating from international norms for the protection of human rights, holding that the
practice of apartheid and racial discrimination provided a sound basis for the Security
Council to terminate the mandate under which South Africa had administered South
West Africa/Namibia, and for barring erga omnes, including non-Member States of the
United Nations, recognition of the legality of any acts of the South African government
in violation of the concerned Security Council Resolution. Advisory Opinion, supra.
The ICJ thereby overruled its earlier decision in Ethiopia v. South Africa; see also Liberia
v. South Africa (Second Phase), 1966 I.CJ. 6 (holding, on basis of principle of reciproc-
ity, that Applicants had no interest in matter and therefore lacked standing in case). See
generally J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 9, 67-71
(1991).
256. Vasak, supra note 253, at 404-07. Other attributes that signify the specificity of
international human rights law, according to Karel Vasak, include the standing of indi-
viduals as subjects of international human rights law, necessary compliance of interna-
tional human rights law with norms of the legal idea (legal ethics), international
human rights law being a derivative system (deriving its substance from national systems
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ternational customary law cannot be shielded behind the refusal
of their governments to submit to institutions and proceedings
established to prosecute those crimes.
Pejic made a further observation as to inherent jurisdiction
of the ICC, which cannot be contested:
[I]nherent jurisdiction does not mean exclusive or primary
jurisdiction. It does not imply that the court will have a better
claim than national courts to exercise jurisdiction. It will
often happen that a case which involves a crime within the
ICC's inherent jurisdiction will be tried by a national court
because it has been determined that domestic jurisdiction
takes precedence. It should be remembered that, in keeping
with the principle of complementarity, the court would be
seized of a case only when a national criminal justice system is
genuinely unwilling or unable to pursue a case. 257
D. Safeguards Against Frivolous Prosecutions
The United States was one of seven countries that voted
against the adoption of the ICC Statute. 258 The U.S. delegation
participated in the deliberations in New York and in Rome with
a simple mandate: opt for a viable tribunal subject only to the
condition that the United States be given the competence to
prevent the prosecution of U.S. citizens in the ICC!
In an interview with the Washington Post, David Scheffer, the
then-newly appointed Ambassador-at-Large for War Crime Issues
of the United States (and later head of the U.S. delegation in
Rome), said that "[a] ny arrangement by which a UN-sponsored
tribunal could assert jurisdiction to prosecute Americans would
be political poison in Congress. '259 And he was right. Senator
Jesse Helms (Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the U.S. Senate) in a letter to Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, dated 26 March 1998, while lamenting press reports
indicating "that the United States is 'showing new flexibility' in
for the protection of human rights), and international human rights law's purport of
laying down minimum standards only. Id.
257. Pejic, supra note 252, at 321.
258. Other delegations that voted against adoption of the ICC Statute included
China, India, and Israel.
259. Thomas W. Lippman, Ambassador to the Darkest Areas of Human Conflict, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 18, 1997, at A19.
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its negotiating position on the creation of a new permanent UN
International Criminal Court," stated quite emphatically:
Madam Secretary, I am unalterably opposed to the creation
of a permanent UN criminal court .... [A] treaty establish-
ing such a court without a clear US veto .... will be dead-on-
arrival at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
An editorial writer of the New York Times on one occasion de-
picted the U.S. position as a matter of "'everybody but us' jus-
tice "Z6-a position, she went on to say, "that would... invite the
other nations of the world to look at the court as something that
the United States has designed for its own purposes. 261
The United States sought to achieve its goal by means of
several strategies. The most obvious means of shielding U.S. citi-
zens from prosecution in the ICC would be to require Security
Council consent for all prosecutions in that court so as to make
allowance for the United States to utilize its veto in the Security
Council to forestall the prosecution of U.S. citizens. When this
proved to be unacceptable to a vast majority of states, the U.S.
delegation attempted to devise conditions that would afford
Washington the power to achieve its objective by not ratifying
the ICC Statute, combined with either a "state-consent" or an
"opt-out" regime.
The state consent arrangement as envisaged by the U.S. del-
egation would make the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC de-
pendent on ratification of the ICC Statute by the state in whose
territory the act was committed (the territorial state) and the na-
tion-state of the accused,2 6 2 or alternatively by rendering ICC ju-
risdiction over acts committed in the territory of a state not party
to the ICC Statute or by officials or agents of those states "in the
course of official duties and acknowledged by the State as such,"
subject to acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC by the non-
State Party concerned. 26" The United States finally proposed an
260. Tina Rosenberg, War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1383, 1408 (1998).
261. Id. at 1409-10.
262. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, 53rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.70 (1998).
263. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.90 (1998).
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opt-out regime in regard to crimes against humanity and war
crimes that will remain in force for ten years, combined with the
right of a State Party that opted out under this regime to with-
draw from the Statute with immediate effect upon conclusion of
the ten-year period.264 The United States was willing to accept
the jurisdiction of the ICC for acts of genocide because that is
not the kind of criminal conduct U.S. citizens are likely to en-
gage. All of these proposals were rejected by the Rome Confer-
ence-for obviously good reasons based on the demands of
equal protection and non-discrimination as essential compo-
nents of retributive justice, and the need for a truly effective tri-
bunal to deal with matters that fall within the jurisdiction ratione
materiae of the ICC.
States concerned about their sovereignty may take comfort
in precautions embodied in the ICC Statute to prevent frivolous
prosecutions. For instance, the Prosecutor decides whether to
proceed with a prosecution, taking into account, among other
things, the conditions of admissibility laid down in Article 17.265
Further, the decision to prosecute (or not to prosecute) is sub-
ject to review by the Pre-Trial Chamber (of three judges)266 Ad-
ditionally, the jurisdiction of the ICC may be challenged on the
basis of the principle of complementarity by the accused, by a
state that has jurisdiction to prosecute the accused, or by the
territorial state or the national state of the accused.2 6 7 Last, the
ICC may of its own accord determine the admissibility of the
case with a view to the prior right of a state to prosecute the
accused.268
The principle of complementarity is also decisive when the
custodian state receives a request from the ICC to surrender a
suspect to the court269 and is also called upon to extradite the
same person to another state270 that has jurisdiction to prosecute
that person. The custodian state is required to surrender a sus-
pect to the ICC only after the ICC has established that the state
264. Id.
265. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1).
266. Id. art. 53(3).
267. Id. art. 19(2).
268. Id. art. 19(1).
269. See id. art. 102(a). The word "surrender" is reserved for delivering up a per-
son to the ICC. Id.
270. See id. art. 102(b). The word "extradition" is reserved for delivering up a
person from one state to another. Id.
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requesting extradition is unwilling or unable to prosecute that
person-that is, if the requesting state is a State Party to the ICC
Statute.27' If the requesting state is not a State Party to the ICC
Statute and the custodian state is not under an obligation, by
virtue of an extradition treaty or otherwise, to extradite the sus-
pect to the requesting state, then the custodian state will be
obliged to surrender the suspect to the ICC.2 7 2 If the requesting
state is not a State Party to the ICC Statute but the custodian
state is under an international obligation to extradite the suspect
to the requesting state, then the custodian state is given a discre-
tion to either surrender the suspect to the ICC or to extradite
her/him to the requesting state.273 This is not an absolute dis-
cretion: the custodian state must in the exercise of its discretion
take into account all the relevant facts, including the date on
which the request to surrender and the request to extradite were
received (presumably the fact that the one or the other was re-
ceived at an earlier date will count for something), the interests
of the requesting state in the matter, including, inter alia,
whether the crime was committed in the territory of the request-
ing state, the nationality of the suspect and of the victims of the
crime (the question here is presumably what interest the re-
questing state might have in prosecuting the suspect), and the
possible surrender of the suspect by the requesting state to the
ICC.2 7 4
The ICC Statute is also quite meticulous in stipulating the
duty of the custodian state in cases where the ICC requests the
surrendering of a suspect for a particular crime while the re-
questing state seeks extradition of the same person to stand trial
for conduct other than that which constitutes the basis of the
crime which the ICC has in mind.275 Here a distinction is not
made, as far as the requesting state is concerned, between States
Parties to the ICC Statute and non-States Parties. But if the cus-
todian state is not under an international obligation to extradite
the suspect to the requesting state, priority must always be given
271. Id. art. 90(2).
272. Id. art. 90(4). If the question of admissibility of the case in the ICC has not
yet been determined, then the custodian state can deal with the request for extradition
at its own discretion. Id. art. 90(5).
273. Id. art. 90(6).
274. Id.
275. Id. art. 90(7).
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to the request of the ICC. If, on the other hand, the custodian
state is under an international obligation to extradite the suspect
to the requesting state, then it is again given ajudicial discretion
to choose between the ICC and the requesting state, taking into
account the same considerations stipulated above.27 6
IV. THE PROSECUTION OF GENOCIDE IN THE
UNITED STATES
The United States in 1986 ratified the Genocide Conven-
tion subject to a package of reservations, understandings, and
declarations ("RUDs"). These RUDs included two reservations,
five understandings, and one declaration.2 77 The declaration
made the entering into force of the ratification instrument de-
pendent on the enactment of implementation legislation, which
occured in 1988 when the Genocide Convention Implementa-
tion Act (the Proxmire Act) became law.278
The reservations required, in the one instance, specific con-
sent to submit a dispute involving the Genocide Convention to
the International Court ofJustice, and the other, a proclamation
concerning the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over the
treaty obligations of the United States. These reservations have
no bearing on prosecutions for acts of genocide in an interna-
tional tribunal. The ICC Statute authorized the Assembly of
States Parties to make recommendations for the settlement of
disputes between two or more States Parties regarding the inter-
pretation or application of the statute, and expressly provides
that those recommendations can include referral of the dispute
to the International Court of Justice, 279 but that applies to dis-
putes regarding the ICC Statute and not to disputes concerning
the Genocide Convention. Moreover, the supremacy reservation
can only apply to the duty imposed on States Parties to the Ge-
nocide Convention to enact municipal legislation to give effect to
the provisions of the Genocide Convention and to provide effec-
tive penalties in their domestic criminal justice systems for persons
276. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
277. S. Res. on the Ratification of the Genocide Convention, 99th Cong. 2349
(Feb. 19, 1986) (enacted). As to the package of RUDs, seeJordan J. Paust, Congress and
Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away With It, 11 MCH. J. INT'L L. 90 (1989); Lippman,
supra note 3, at 483-88.
278. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1091-93 (1988).
279. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 119(2).
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guilty of genocide. 2 0 The supremacy reservation was in any
event superfluous, since the Genocide Convention expressly re-
quires States Parties to do the above "in accordance with their
Constitutions. "281
The list of understandings2s2 entails the following devices:
" "intent to destroy in whole or in part" required by Article
II of the Convention must be taken to mean the specific
intent to destroy in whole "or in substantial part";
" "mental harm" referred to in Article 11(b) of the Conven-
tion must be restricted to "permanent impairment of
mental faculties through drugs, torture, or similar tech-
niques";
" the principle of double criminality must apply as a condi-
tion of extradition;
" acts committed in armed conflict without the require-
ment of specific intent must not be taken to constitute
genocide; and
" participation of the United States in an international pe-
nal court as contemplated by Article VI of the Convention
will be conditional upon ratification of the concerned
treaty by the U.S. Senate.
The last two understandings are in conformity with princi-
ples in and underlying the ICC Statute: special (genocidal) in-
tent applies to all instances of genocide, including those commit-
ted in times of war, and the ICC is being established by means of
a multi-national treaty. The double criminality understanding
applies to extradition arrangements for the prosecution of geno-
cide in the municipal courts of another country, and has no
bearing on the surrendering of a suspect for prosecution in the
ICC. The meaning attached by the United States to the concepts
of "intent to destroy ... in part" and to "mental harm" might
substantively deviate from the meaning given to those concepts
in international law.
It has been said that ratification of the Genocide Conven-
tion by the U.S. Senate was merely "a symbolic act ' 28 3 and that
280. See Genocide Convention, supra note 5, art. V.
281. Id.
282. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
283. LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
144, 238 (1991).
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the Senate, by insisting on the so-called Sovereignty Package re-
flected in the RUDs, was determined to "reduce the convention
to nothing more than a symbol of opposition to genocide," 284 or,
in the words of Jordan Paust, "to gut the treaty of any meaning-
ful effect. '285 The Genocide Convention Implementation Act re-
stricts jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts to instances of genocide
committed in the United States, and to acts of genocide commit-
ted by a U.S. citizen abroad. Its ultimate effect is seemingly to
preclude the prosecution in the United States of foreign nation-
als who have committed acts of genocide in a foreign country,
thereby rendering the United States a safe haven for foreign per-
petrators of genocide.286
Consider the following hypothetical. Elizaphan Ntakiru-
timana is wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda for crimes committed in that country as part of the
genocidal onslaught of Hutus against the Tutsi. Ntakirutimana
found his way to Texas, where he was detained. He cannot be
extradited to Rwanda under any extradition treaty that might ex-
ist, because the Tribunal is not part of the criminal justice system
of Rwanda. Special legislation was, therefore, enacted in the
United States to authorize the surrender of persons wanted for
prosecution in the ad hoc criminal tribunals.287 On January 24,
1995, the United States had entered into an Agreement on Sur-
render of Persons Between the Government of the United States
and the Tribunal [for Rwanda] and sought to surrender Ntakiru-
timana to the Rwandan tribunal pursuant to that agreement, as
sanctioned by the subsequent legislation. The Federal District
Court would have nothing of it.288 Since the Agreement was not
entered into in accordance with the constitutional treaty proce-
dures, requiring approval of an international treaty by a two-
thirds majority of the U.S. Senate, it was unenforceable and in-
deed unconstitutional. The Court ordered the release of the
suspect from custody.
Because Ntakirutimana is not a U.S. citizen and the criminal
acts of which he was suspected were not committed in the
284. Id. at 241.
285. Paust, supra note 236, at 94.
286. See Steven, supra note 22, at 462, 464-65.
287. See National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal year 1996, Pub. L. 104-
106 of Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 486 (1996).
288. In Re Surrender of Ntakirutimana, 988 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D.Tex. 1997).
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United States, he could not be prosecuted in the United States
under the Genocide Convention Implementation Act. The
question therefore arises whether the United States is precluded
by its own legislation from assuming universal jurisdiction to
prosecute acts of genocide as offenses under customary interna-
tional law committed by persons in the position of Ntakiru-
timana. The Constitution of the United States authorizes Con-
gress "[t]o define . . . offences against the Law of Nations,"289
and-as noted by Jordan Paust-Congress is thereby merely
given "a concurrent power to define and punish offences against
international law, not an exclusive power at the expense of the
treaty power and that of the judiciary, which are also constitu-
tionally based. ' 29 0 Paust emphasized that domestic legislation
was not required in order to prosecute treaty-based acts of geno-
cide in the United States,2 1' and it might further be argued that
the competence of U.S. courts to prosecute crimes under the law
of nations is not rendered obsolete by municipal legislation that
deals only partially with the same international crime. Had
Ntakirutimana been a U.S. citizen, or had the acts been commit-
ted in the United States, the prosecution would arguably have to
be conducted under the auspices and within the confines of the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act. But since that is not
the case, he can arguably be prosecuted for his unlawful deeds as
offenses under the law of nations (customary international law).
There are precedents to substantiate this course of conduct:
although war crimes have been codified in the Unified Code of
Military Justice in 1950, military tribunals sometimes prefer
charges based on the law of nations.292
As far as the ICC is concerned, the restricted competence
afforded to U.S. courts by the Genocide Convention Implemen-
tation Act is in any event of no consequence. It would at best
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
290. Paust, supra note 275, at 103.
291. Id. at 103-04.
292. In terms of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, "all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land." See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In terms of art. 1(8)(10), Congress has been
given the power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. In conse-
quence of the latter provision, U.S. military tribunals have prosecuted members of the
armed forces under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or, alternatively, for offenses
against the law of nations. Paust, supra note 146, at 213; Steven, supra note 22, at 444.
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only render U.S. courts "unable" to prosecute foreign perpetra-
tors of genocide who seek refuge in the United States. Should
the United States ratify the ICC Statute, it would be under a
treaty obligation to surrender such fugitives to the ICC to be
prosecuted in that forum. The United States could thus do no
more than specify the extent to which it was prepared, domesti-
cally, to comply with its State-Party obligations under Article V of
the Genocide Convention.
An apologist for U.S. rejection of the ICC Statute from the
perspective of U.S. self-interest referred to the crime of genocide
from a very special standpoint:293 while noting that the ICC Stat-
ute expressly precludes its ratification subject to reservations294
and referring to the RUDs that attended ratification of the Ge-
nocide Convention by the United States, he maintained that the
ICC Statute implicated the national sovereignty of the United
States with regard to the crime of genocide. He quite rightly
pointed out that the United States will be subject to the meaning
attached to genocide by an international tribunal in disregard of
the meaning preferred by the U.S. Senate. 295
As indicated earlier, the question of state sovereignty was
never a major issue at the Rome Conference. The U.S. apologist
furthermore missed the point that prosecution of a U.S. citizen
for acts of genocide (as defined by international law) does not
depend on U.S. Senate ratification of the ICC Statute, or for that
matter, of the Genocide Convention. Acts of genocide will be
prosecuted in the ICC as a crime under customary international
law, informed by the definition of genocide in the ICC Statute
and the Genocide Convention, and not by the whims and fancies
of the U.S. Senate.
CONCLUSION
As far as international law is concerned, the formal circum-
scription of the crime of genocide in the Genocide Convention
has become sacrosanct-if for no other reason then simply be-
cause government representatives charged with composing in-
ternational instruments that are pertinent in this regard are
293. See John Bolton, Reject and Oppose the International Criminal Court, in TOWARD
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 37, 39 (Alton Frye ed., 1999).
294. ICC Statute, supra note 11, art. 120.
295. See Paust, supra note 236, at 94.
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loath to reopen debates and revitalize controversies that have al-
ready been settled. The substance of the concept of genocide
has, however, not remained stagnant. The International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Akayesu has, for exam-
ple, broadened the scope of the groups expressly protected by
the Genocide Convention (national, ethnical, racial, and reli-
gious groups) to include all institutional (involuntary) social en-
tities. This would include persons affiliated in group-conscious
communities by social status, not founded on either nationality,
ethnicity, race, or religion, provided only that one is-so to
speak-born into the social group. It would also include per-
sons who find a common bond through sexual identity, gender,
and sexual orientation.
This still leaves other groups whose destruction might be
sought in the process of power-mongering out in the cold, in-
cluding, for example, persons sharing a common party-political
allegiance. Although a strong argument can be advanced in sup-
port of the proposition that convictions of any kind-including
religious and political persuasions-are not (entirely) matters of
personal choice, the travaux priparatoires of the Genocide Con-
vention bears strong testimony against including political groups
among those whose destruction the convention sought to expose
to punishment under the rubric of genocide. Compelling argu-
ments have been advanced to show that the persecution of polit-
ical groups in a manner and on a scale that would otherwise sat-
isfy the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide is indeed
genocide under the norms of customary international law. Since
the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals, including the
ICC, has been linked to the definition of genocide in the Geno-
cide Convention, it might however be difficult to persuade the
prosecution in those tribunals to take action against someone
whose criminal conduct does not fall squarely within the con-
fines of the convention (as refined and expanded by judicial in-
terpretation).
As far as the ICC is concerned, the following counter-argu-
ment ought to be put to the test: although the ICC Statute bor-
rowed its definition of genocide from the Genocide Convention,
the court does not profess to enforce the Genocide Convention
per se but has been established with a view to bringing to justice
perpetrators of the most heinous crimes under customary interna-
tional law. The primary consideration of the ICC should there-
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fore be whether the charges in any particular case are based on
the proscriptions of customary international law that are covered
by its subject-matter jurisdiction and as defined in the ICC Stat-
ute. Provided the customary law offense is covered by the word-
ing selected by drafters of the ICC Statute to define that offense,
the ICC will be competent to hear the case. The ICC is bound
by the wording of the Genocide Convention and not by its
travaux priparatoires.
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, including ge-
nocide, are furthermore subject to universal jurisdiction. The
primary competence and duty to bring perpetrators of those
crimes to justice rest with the nation-state having custody of the
suspect. Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a distinct group that might not come within the confines of
national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups (or other groups
falling within that genus), can nevertheless be prosecuted as acts
of genocide in municipal courts-that is, even if the ICC or an
ad hoc international tribunal would not entertain jurisdiction in
the matter, provided that jurisdiction of the municipal court,
founded on the principle of universality, is not excluded by the
rules of criminal procedure that regulate the court's compe-
tence to hear a case.
Prosecution of, for example, a U.S. citizen for acts of geno-
cide under the criminal justice system of another country or in
the ICC is for the same reason not dependent on ratification of
the ICC Statute by the United States. Conviction in a foreign
jurisdiction, or in the ICC, of a U.S. citizen for acts of genocide is
also not determined by the meaning attached to "genocide" in
the instrument that attended the ratification by the United
States of the Genocide Convention in 1986 or by the provisions
of the Genocide Implementation Act of 1988. The United States
could by way of municipal law do no more than specify the ex-
tent to which it was prepared, domestically, to comply with its
State-Party obligations under Article V of the Genocide Conven-
tion. The definition and conditions for the prosecution of acts
of genocide under international law is ultra vires the United
States.
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